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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to §§ 78A-3-
102(4), 78 A-4-103(2)(j), UCA (1953). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Where subdivision Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions 
("CC&R's") contain no authority to regulate colors of residences, and limit the 
right to approve or disapprove alterations to structural changes in use, may the 
Homeowners Association ("HOA") maintain an action, with lis pendens, for 
change of color of a garage door'.' Raised and preserved: Motion for Summary 
Judgment 4/1/08, Rec. p. 78; Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment 1/29/09, 
Rec.p. 351. 
2. Where a subdivision presents a history of free selection of exterior 
colors, may the HO A discriminate against an individual ow nei lor selection of a 
garage door color? Raised and preserved: Motion for Summary Judgment 4/1/08, 
Rec. p. 78; Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment 1/29/09, Rec. p. 351. 
3. May an action to enforce a non-existent power over realty be sup-
ported by a lis pendens? Raised and preserved: Motion to Strike Lis Pendens 9/ 
16/08, Rec. p. 309. 
4. Where maintenance of the action drives defendant into bankruptcy, 
may the action be dismissed as moot, terminating defendant's right to a determina-
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tion that the action was wrongfully maintained? Raised and Preserved: Response 
to Motion to Dismiss 10/7/10, Rec. p. 940. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The decisions of the district court herein were made on motions for summary 
judgment. The issues presented, therefore, appear to be ones of law, reviewed de 
novo, without deference for the views of the district court. E.g., Geisdorfv. 
Doughty, 672 P. 2d 67, 69-70 (Utah 1998); Robinson v. State, 20 P. 3d 396, 398 
(Utah 2007). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS/STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Appellant was the owner of a residence in Barton Hills Subdivision. 
Ruling 10/17/08 at 1 -2. See Record pp. 331-332. 
2. Appellant installed certain modifications to the exterior of the prem-
ises, including re-painting the garage door a shade of brown. Id. 
3. Appellee Home Owner's Association ("HOA") filled an action against 
appellant asserting that a number of these modifications violated the Covenants, 
Conditions and Restrictions ("CC&R's") for the subdivision. The Complaint was 
filed with a lis pendens. Id. Record at pp. 1,47 
4. There was then pending a sale of the residence at a substantial value. 
The lis pendens prevented the sale. Id. at 9-12. Record p. 47. 
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5. Appellee HOA subsequently reduced its claims against appellant to 
one that appellant's garage door as re-painted was "too dark". Declaration of Keith 
Jones, 3/21/09. See Addendum Doc 7. 
6. Upon appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the district court deter-
mined that while the CC&R's contained no express power over colors, re-painting 
was an "alteration" over which the HOA Design Committee had unlimited discre-
tion to prevent "architectural incompatibility". Ruling 10/17/08. See Record p.331. 
7. Brown is a color which appears on exteriors throughout the subdivi-
sion, and occurs naturally in materials ("wood, brick, stucco") specifically author-
ized by the CC&R's for exteriors. Roofs in the subdivision were almost uniformly 
a darker brown than appellant's garage door. Ruling 7/31/09 at 9-10. Record p.664. 
8. The district court also denied appellee's cross-motion for summary 
judgment, reserving the issue whether the implied authority found had been aban-
doned in light of the facts recited in paragraph 7. Ruling 10/17/08. Record p.331. 
9. Prevention of the pending sale drove appellant into bankruptcy. No-
tice of Bankruptcy Filing 7/13/09. Record at p. 659. 
10. Appellee then moved to dismiss its own Complaint and any counter-
claims thereto, each party to bear its own costs and fees. Motion to Dismiss and 
for Summary Judgment 9/15/10. Record at pp. 829, 832. 
11. The district court granted the latter motion. Order 12/22/10. Record p. 
968. 
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12. This appeal was timely filed upon entry of the latter order. Notice of 
Appeal 1/11/11. See Record at p. 971. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court improperly implied in CC&R's which don't expressly so 
provide, an unqualified power to restrict the use on a garage door of a shade of 
color common throughout a subdivision, upon the ground that, in the view of the 
HOA's "Design Committee" the shade was "too dark." The implication violates 
Utah law regarding implication of restrictive covenants, limitation of express terms 
to their context and particular language, and reasonable application of restrictive 
authority. The district court then, at the request of appellee, dismissed the Com-
plaint and counterclaims as moot, because imposition of the improper restriction 
drove appellant into bankruptcy and loss of the property. 
This court should reverse, finding no authority to so restrict use of appel-
lant's property, and remand to the district court for assessment of fees and costs 
against appellee, and pursuit of an action for wrongful use of civil proceedings at 
the option of appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
THE POWER IMPLIED DID NOT EXIST. 
The CC&R's for Barton Woods were first adopted in 1993. See Addendum .. 
"5". They were amended in 1997. See Addendum "6". As first adopted, and 
thereafter, they provided (Section 3.2): 
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3.2 Description of Lots: The Project consists of indi-
vidual lots, each of which may or may not be improved and 
may or may not include improvements authorized on the 
may and/or by the City of Bountiful, Utah. The improve-
ments on some or all of the lots may consist of single family 
or one-half (1/2) of a duplex building with the other one-half 
(1/2) of the structure being on an adjoining lot. The exterior 
of all buildings will be constructed of brick on the lower 
part, with the upper part being wood, stucco and/or such 
other materials authorized by the committee. All improve-
ments shall be constructed in a style and of materials archi-
tecturally compatible with the other improvements on the 
Project. 
Respecting "architectural control," the 1993 version provided (Section 4.3): 
4.3 Architectural Control: The Association, by and 
through the Committee, shall be charged and empowered 
with control of all construction, improvements, and land-
scaping on the Project to ensure consistency and compatibil-
ity of all improvements and landscaping on the Project. 
Respecting "alterations," the 1993 and 1998 versions provide: 
5.3 Alterations, Additions and Attachments: No build-
ing, fence, wall, tennis court, hot tub or similar structure, 
swimming pool or other structure, satellite dish or receiver, 
or outside antenna shall be commenced, erected, altered, 
placed or permitted to exist on any portion of the Project, 
without the prior written approval of the Management 
Committee. All buildings, alterations, improvements, addi-
tions and maintenance on the Subject Property shall be made 
in a workmanlike manner and shall be architecturally com-
patible with the rest of the Project. 
In 1998, Section 4.3 was deleted and replaced with the following: 
4.3 Design Review Committee: The purposes of the 
Design Review Committee (the "Committee") shall be to 
create, maintain and improve Barton Woods Planned Unit 
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Development as a pleasant and desirable environment, to es-
tablish and preserve a harmonious design for the community 
and to protect and promote the value of the Property, exte-
rior design, landscaping and changes or alterations to the ex-
isting use of the Property. 
There was then added a Paragraph 4.5, as follows: 
4.5 Powers of Design Review Committee: The Com-
mittee is hereby authorized to perform the design review 
functions prescribed in this Declaration and the Associa-
tion's Bylaws and to carry out the provisions set forth 
therein. 
The Committee may reject any home and land-
scape plans it deems do not comply with the provisions of 
this Declaration. The decision of the Committee may be re-
viewed by the Board on appeal by the owner or at the 
Board's own discretion. No construction may begin on any 
Lot until the Committee has approved the home and land-
scape plans. 
There do not appear to be other directly relevant provisions. 
While the CC&R's speak of "materials" and "architectural" "style", except 
insofar as they authorize materials ("brick — wood, stucco"), they do not pre-
scribe colors which may be used, nor do they designate lighter or darker shades of 
acceptable colors. Nothing in the present action questions the materials used by 
defendant, or the architectural style of the subject premises. Plaintiff asserted that, 
as re-painted, defendant's garage door was "too dark." Early claims about other 
features of the residence (rock trim, etc.) were abandoned. 
It appears, therefore, that any authority to regulate must derive from Section 
5.3, and any requirement therein that "alterations" be "architecturally compatible." 
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Appellee asserted that the "purpose" of the Design Review Committee was "to es-
tablish and preserve a harmonious design for the community" (f 4.5), and allowed 
it to "reject any home — plans it deem[ed] not to comply with the provisions of 
this Declaration." Thus, says appellee, it could reject any shade of paint color it 
regarded as "too dark." 
There are two fundamental difficulties with this position, approved by the dis-
trict court. First, Section 5.3 appears to deal with alterations which may affect use 
or function. So long as a structure is not changed in use from "single family resi-
dential living purposes," or common adjuncts to such use ("fence, wall, tennis 
court, hot tub — swimming pool," etc.), it is questionable whether the section ap-
plies or authorizes review by the Committee. It seems questionable, for example, 
whether tinting windows, changing from wood to asphalt shingles, or elimination 
of a pond from the landscaping, would activate this provision. See, e.g., Freeman 
v. Gee, 423 P. 2d 155,159 (Utah 1967); Parrish v. Richards, 336 P. 2d 122, 123 
(Utah 1959). 
Further, the standard is "architectural compatibility." The complaint here is 
that the color chosen by appellant for her garage door was "too dark." It is not 
claimed, for example, that such color, a shade of brown, does not naturally occur 
among the commonplace colors of materials specifically approved for the exterior 
of buildings in this subdivision: brick, wood, stucco. It is not claimed that brown 
of varying shades is not used as an exterior color throughout the subdivision. 
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Roofs in the subdivision are commonly a darker shade of brown. The Complaint is 
that the shade chosen by appellant on her garage door is deemed "too dark" by the 
Committee. 
Were this a case of prescription of a range of permissible colors ("earth tones," 
Fink v. Miller, 896 P. 2d 649, 655 (U. Apps. 19995)) and a choice of a hue outside 
that range (fuchsia, orange, chartreuse), the argument might be better. A bright, 
unnatural hue might be regarded as "incompatible" with a muted, naturally-
occurring range of color. That, however, is not this case. It would seem to be im-
possible to show that one shade of brown is architecturally incompatible with other 
shades of brown. Indeed, the ordinary concepts of hue and shade in color would 
appear to dictate that while hues (red, blue, yellow) may be incompatible, shades 
of the same color cannot be. 
The Utah rules regarding enforceability of restrictive covenants is well-
developed: 
Where expressly stated, restrictive covenants are 
not favored in the law and are strictly construed in 
favor of the free and unrestricted use of property. 
Robbins v. Finlav. 645 P.2d 623. 627 (Utah 1982): 
Parrish v. Richards. 8 Utah 2d 419. 421. 336 P.2d 
122. 123 0959): Freeman v. Gee. 18 Utah 2d 339. 
345. 423 P.2d 155. 159 (1967\ Generally, express 
restrictive covenants are upheld only "where they 
are necessary for the protection of the business for 
the benefit of which the covenant was made and no 
greater restraint is imposed than is reasonably nec-
essary to secure such protection." Allen v. Rose 
Park Pharmacy. 120 Utah 608. 614. 237 P.2d 823. 
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826 (1951). Under certain extreme circumstances, 
a restrictive covenant may arise by implication 
from the language of a deed or lease or from the 
conduct of the parties. 20 Am.Jur.2d Covenants, 
Conditions, and Restrictions § 173 (1965). As a 
general rule, however, implied covenants are not 
favored in the law. Id. at § 12; Brown v. Safeway 
Stores, Inc., 94 Wash.2d 359, 617 P.2d 704 (1980), 
In order for a restrictive covenant to be implied, 
the support for it must be "plain and unmistakable" 
or it must be "necessary" as a matter of law. 
AmJur.2d at § 173. 
St. Benedict's DeveL Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 198 (Utah 1991). 
Even where it can be found that an authority to restrict is implied, any exercise of 
the authority "must be reasonable and made in good faith and must not be arbitrary 
or capricious." Fink v. Miller, 896 P. 2d 649, 655 N. 7 (U. Apps. 1995). Further, 
the rule of ejusdem generis applies. Under that rule, a general term like "altera-
tion" will "be construed according to the specific enumerations" contained in the 
grant of authority to regulate. Cafe Rio v. Larkin-Giffbrd-Overton, LLC, 207 P.3d 
1235, 1240-1242 (Utah 2009); Freeman v. Gee, supra; Parrish v. Richards, supra. 
Where, for example, the enumerations are of changes in use, no authority will be 
implied to restrict changes in appearance. Id. 
The district court's ruling on authority of the Design Committee under the 
CC&R's was as follows: 
The defendant has presented several issues in her 
motion for summary judgment. Those issues are: 
whether the CC&R's regulate colors; whether the 
CC&R's grant control to the Design Review Com-
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mittee; whether the CC&R's have been abandoned; 
whether the CC&R's have been uniformly enforced; 
and whether the defendant's home is harmonious 
with the other homes in the subdivision. 
In addressing the first issue, the Court finds that 
the CC&R's do regulate colors, despite the absence 
of the word "colors" in the CC&R's. In paragraph 
5.3 of the Amended CC&R's, it states that no build-
ing, fence, wall, tennis court, satellite dish or re-
ceiver, or outside antenna shall be altered without 
the prior written approval of the Design Review 
Committee. A change of color is clearly an altera-
tion. Therefore, the defendant's changes to the col-
ors of her door, entry way, etc. would clearly fall 
under 15.3. 
In addressing the second issue, the Court notes 
that the paragraphs 4.3 and 5.3 of the CC&R's give 
the Design Review Committee the authority to de-
termine whether alterations, improvements, addi-
tions, etc. to the property are harmonious and archi-
tecturally compatible with other properties in the 
subdivision. Therefore, the design Review Commit-
tee does have control and authority over such 
changes, including the colors that might be changed. 
Memorandum Decision 10/17/08. That is, the Design Committee has an implied 
power, derivative of its power over "alterations", which extends beyond structural 
alterations in use, to cover changes in paint color to a shade considered "too dark" 
in its application to a garage door, though demonstrably less dark than shades of 
the same color on, for example, roofs throughout the subdivision. This power is 
absolute, as a court may not question the Design Committee's discretion under the 
phrase "architecturally compatible." 
The ruling is wrong on numerous grounds. 
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The District Court plainly did not construe the power alleged strictly, in fa-
vor of free, unrestricted use of the property. 
Even if the power described were not merely implied, it could not be upheld 
except "where — necessary for the protection of the business for the benefit of 
which the covenant was made and no greater restraint is imposed than is reasona-
bly necessary to secure such protection." St. Benedict's Devel. Co. v. St Benedict's 
Hosp.y supra. There is not even a claim here that the restrictive power alleged 
serves any purpose except the personal tastes of the Design Committee. No one 
has suggested how the use of a "dark" shade of brown could be "architecturally in-
compatible" with other shades of brown regularly permitted, and, in fact, pre-
scribed as colors naturally occurring in "wood" and "brick". 
The implication of the alleged power plainly is not "necessary as a matter of 
law." While such a claim might be made regarding structural "alterations" of use, 
the glib conclusion that power over all things that might be called "alterations," in-
cluding re-painting, is so fundamental to the nature of the subdivision, is not 
merely unsupported, but insupportable. See Cafe Rio, supra; Freeman, supra; 
Parrish, supra. 
Finally, the conclusion that any imposition of its taste in colors by the De-
sign Committee is beyond the power of courts is unreasonable on its face. The 
mere recitation of the rubric "too dark," without a claim or showing that such use 
of color otherwise regularly permitted is, or even could be, "architecturally incom-
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patible," does not begin to comply with the requirement that committee decisions 
be "reasonable — in good faith and — not — arbitrary or capricious." The dis-
trict court has conferred by implication a power which is mere caprice. 
DISMISSAL WAS IMPROPER. 
The district court never resolved the issue whether the alleged power to dic-
tate paint colors had been uniformly enforced, or abandoned. It declined to grasp 
that the overwhelming evidence of non-enforcement showed that no such power 
could be implied, and that the alleged violation could not be asserted to be "archi-
tecturally incompatible." 
The error in construction of the CC&R's, however, allowed appellee to en-
force a power it did not have by lis pendens, preventing pending sale of the subject 
realty. The imposition occurred slightly prior to the national collapse of real estate 
prices, and deprived appellant of hundreds of thousands of dollars in value. Even-
tually, the deprivation drove appellant into bankruptcy. 
Appellee then moved to dismiss its own complaint as moot, because appel-
lant had lost the property: 
" . . . Defendant no longer has standing to pursue either of her counter-
claims. She has surrendered the Property . . . " 
This neglected to note that appellee's own claim of authority remained be-
fore the court. This would be true even if it were correct that claim and defense 
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were now reduced to a question whether, by regular failure of enforcement, plain-
tiff had abandoned the authority claimed. 
Article X, section 10.5 of the subject CC&R's provides: 
If any party governed by the terms of this Declaration 
defaults under any provision hereof, that defaulting 
party shall pay all costs and attorney's fee incurred by 
another party to enforce the provisions hereof, 
whether incurred through formal lawsuit or otherwise. 
Of course, plaintiff, as successor of the founder of the subdivision is a "party gov-
erned by the terms of this Declaration." Plaintiff is responsible for fees and costs 
int his matter. This asserts a right which accrued at the time of filing of the original 
action. What disposition was thereafter made of the property is irrelevant. 
Further, the use of a lis pendens to block sale of the realty during the asser-
tion of a non-existent power subjects appellee to a claims for wrongful use of civil 
proceedings. The dismissal here prevents realization upon such claims by appel-
lant. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Court should reverse all rulings of the district court herein, reserving a 
ruling on the issue of abandonment. The Court should then either remand the mat-
ter to the district court to complete a ruling on abandonment, or should remit the 
parties to an assessment of fees and costs in favor of appellants, and such action for 
wrongful proceedings as appellant deems appropriate. 
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Respectfully submitted this 7th day of July, 2011. 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BARTON WOODS HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENA STEWART, an individual, and JOHN 
DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
and 
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
and 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO STRDXE LIS PENDENS 
Case No. 070700680 
Judge Jon M. Memmott 
There are currently three motions pending before the Court The Court has reviewed the 
moving and responding papers for each motion, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court 
DENIES defendant's motion for summary judgment, DENIES the plaintiffs cross-motion for 
summary judgment, and also DENIES defendant's motion to strike lis pendens. 
BACKGROUND 
The plaintiff filed its complaint on December 11,2007. In that complaint, the plaintiff 
alleged that Dena Stewart ("the defendant") had violated restrictive covenants for a planned unit 
development. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had installed dark shutters on 
the front exterior of her home, painted the garage door dark brown or brass, painted the entry to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the home a dark brown or brass, installed or painted the mailbox dark brown or brass, and 
installed rocks on portions of the front exterior walls of the home. The restrictive covenants 
(CC&R's) required improvements to be approved by the Design Review Committee, and the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had not received approval before making these improvements. 
The plaintiff also alleged that these improvements violated the CC&R's because they were not 
harmonious with the other homes in the PUD. 
The defendant filed her answer to the complaint on January 9,2008. In that answer, the 
defendant noted that the subdivision has many similar' Violations," and so it appeared that the 
CC&R's had been abandoned, at least in part, by the plaintiffs. The defendant also filed a 
counterclaim against the plaintiffs, alleging that because the CC&R's stated that all structures 
must be built from brick, wood, or stucco, all of the homes in the PUD were in violation because 
they had windows and doors that included materials such as glass.1 
The defendant then filed an amended answer and counterclaim on January 17,2008. In 
the amended counterclaim, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had allowed owners of lots on 
both sides of her home to encroach on her lot, causing damages of at least $250,000. The plaintiff 
filed a reply to the amended counterclaim on February 7,2008. 
On April 1,2008, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. In her 
memorandum in support of that motion, the defendant argued that the CC&R's do not regulate 
colors. The defendant also argued that the colors she used are 6Chaimonious," and that the "rocks" 
that were allegedly in violation of the CC&R's were in fact bricks. The defendant noted that at 
least two other homes in the PUD have "rocks" on their walls. The defendant included pictures 
The Court notes that this argument is without merit, because such a strict reading of the CC&R's would 
clearly lead to an absurd result 
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of many homes that she alleged were in the PUD, and which she argued used colors that were 
similar to those used on her home. Thus, argued the defendant, her home was "harmonious" 
with other homes in the PUD, and that the plaintiff has either discriminatory enforced the 
CC&R's or simply abandoned them. 
On April 22,2008, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment In that memorandum, the plaintiff argued that there was a 
genuine dispute of material fact relating to the photographs presented by the defendant. The ' 
plaintiff also noted that the defendant did not provide any testimony to authenticate the 
photographs, and the photographs were therefore not competent evidence. In addition, the 
defendant included no other affidavits to show that the CC&R's have been abandoned or not 
uniformly enforced. 
The plaintiff then argued that the CC&R's have not been abandoned and have been 
uniformly applied throughout the development. The plaintiff attached an affidavit from the 
plaintiffs president, Paul Mifeud, in support of its argument. The plaintiff requested that the 
Court grant a Rule 56(f) continuance to allow the parties to conduct discovery. 
In addition, the plaintiff argued that the amended CC&R's place architectural control in 
the Design Review Committee. The defendant did not obtain permission from the Design Review 
Committee to make the changes to her property. The plaintiff argued that failure to do so was a 
violation of the CC&R's, and Paul Mifsud's affidavit demonstrated that the CC&R's had not 
been abandoned. That affidavit also stated that "[t]o the extent other violations have been 
identified on other properties within the development, those violations are in the process of being 
appropriately remedied by the association." 
The plaintiff then filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on April 24, 2008. In its 
memorandum in support: of that motion, the plaintiff argued that the CC&R's required the 
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defendant to obtain prior written approval from the Design Review Committee before making 
any alterations to her property. Because she failed to do so, the'plaintiff argued, and because the 
defendant has admitted that she failed to do so, it is clear that the defendant has violated the 
CC&R's. 
The defendant filed her reply memorandum in support of her motion for summary 
judgment on May 1,2008 and a memorandum in opposition to the plaintiffs cross-motion for 
summary judgment on May 12,2008. In those memoranda, the defendant argued that the 
affidavit of Paul Mifsud should be stricken in its entirety because it is filled with statements that 
are irrelevant, contain legal conclusions, and because it was not notarized. The defendant noted 
that Mr. Mifsud's affidavit included an admission that there were other violations in the 
subdivision. 
The defendant also argued that her motion for summary judgment should be granted 
because the CC&R's did not prescribe or prohibit colors, and because other homes contained 
similar colors, demonstrating either that the CC&R's have been arbitrarily enforced or that they 
have been abandoned. Finally, the defendant noted that because it appeared that there are other 
violations in the subdivision, the requirement to obtain prior approval has either been waived or 
the plaintiff has arbitrarily enforced the CC&R's. 
The plaintiff filed a reply memorandum in support of its cross-motion for summary 
judgment on May 21,2008. The plaintiff argued that the defendant has failed to submit any 
record evidence to dispute the fact that the defendant failed to obtain prior written approval 
before altering her property. The plaintiff noted that it is not an individual homeowner's right to 
determine whether changes to a property are "harmonious." Instead, that right has been given to 
the Design Review Committee. Because the defendant did not seek approval from the Design 
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were not harmonious. The Review Committee has determined that the changes are not 
harmonious, and that determination was not arbitrary and capricious, as shown by the fact that 
the defendant's home is the only home with a brown garage door, exterior brown shutters, rock 
facing, and wood accents. 
The defendant submitted her motion for decision on May 19, 2008, and the plaintiff 
submitted its motion for decision on May 21,2008. The Court conducted a hearing on both 
motions on August 18,2008. The defendant filed an affidavit from Shaun Shepherd on August 
15,2008, and the plaintifif objected to the affidavit as untimely. There was some discussion about 
the pictures submitted by the defendant, and the plaintiff argued that at least one picture was of a 
home located outside of the subdivision. 
On September 16,2008, before the Court had issued its ruling on the motions for 
summary judgment, the defendant filed a motion to strike the lis pendens that was placed on her 
home by the plaintiff. The defendant noted 'that under Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2,2 the filing of a 
lis pendens is restricted to actions affecting title to, or the right of possession of, real property. In 
this case, the action does not affect the title of the defendant, because the plaintiff has only 
sought injunctive relief. Therefore, there is no possibility that her title to the property will be 
affected by this litigation. This action would also not affect her right of possession of the 
property. 
The Court scheduled a hearing for September 24,2008. On that same day, the plaintiff 
filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to strike the lis pendens.3 The plaintiff argued 
that because the plaintiff may succeed in this litigation, the defendant could eventually be ordered 
2
 This statue was recently recodified as Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1303. 
3
 The Court notes that the plaintiffs memorandum was not untimely. Because the original motion was filed 
by the defendant on September 16, 2008, the plaintifif was not required to file its memorandum in opposition until 
October 3, 2008. The Court thanks the plaintiff for filing a memorandum as quickly as possible. 
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to remove the alterations she has placed on her property. If that occurs, and the defendant had 
sold the home, the new owner would be subject to the order. Therefore, the plaintiff argued, any 
prospective purchasers should be put on notice of the ongoing litigation, and the filing of a lis 
pendens is appropriate in this case. The plaintiff cited to cases from Colorada and Arizona in 
support of its position. 
The Court conducted a hearing on September 24,2008, and informed the parties that it 
would include the ruling on the motion to strike Us pendens in its ruling on the motions for 
summary judgment. Having reviewed the papers from both parties, and having reviewed the 
applicable case law, the Court now issues its ruling on all three motions. 
ANALYSIS 
As noted above, there are currently three motions pending before the Court: the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment, 
and the defendant's motion to strike the Us pendens. The Court will address each of those 
motions separately below. 
A. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
The defendant has presented several issues in her motion for summary judgment. Those 
issues are: whether the CC&R's regulate colors; whether the CC&R's grant control to the Design 
Review Committee; whether the CC&R's have been abandoned; whether the CC&R's have been 
uniformly enforced; and whether the defendant's home is harmonious with the other homes in 
the subdivision. 
In addressing the first issue, the Court finds that the CC&R's do regulate colors, despite 
the absence of the word "colors" in the CC&R's. In paragraph 5.3 of the Amended CC&R's, it 
states that no building, fence, wall, tennis court, satelhte dish or receiver, or outside antenna shall 
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is clearly an alteration. Therefore, the defendant's changes to the colors of her door, entry way, 
" etc. would clearly fall under f 5.3. • 
In addressing the second issue, the Court notes that the paragraphs 4.3 and 5.3 of the 
CC&R's give the Design Review Committee the authority to determine whether alterations, .! 
improvements, additions, etc. to the property are harmonious and architecturally compatible with 
other properties in the subdivision. Therefore, the Design Review Committee does have control 
and authority over such changes, including the colors that might be changed. 
The defendant has also argued that her home is harmonious with the other homes in the 
subdivision. The Court notes that it agrees that at least some of the pictures depict homes that 
appear to the Court to be quite similar to the defendant's home, and the Court believes that her 
home is harmonious with the other homes. However, even if these homes are in the same 
subdivision, this Court does not have the authority to override the Design Review Committee's 
determination that tie defendant's home is not harmonious with the other homes. The only 
determination that can be made by this Court is whether the CC&R's have been abandoned or 
whether the Design Review Committee has arbitrarily enforced the CC&R's. 
In support of her motion, the defendant submitted a number of pictures demonstrating 
that her home was hannonious, and that any determination to the contrary must have been 
arbitrary and capricious. However, as noted by the plaintiff, the defendant never authenticated 
those photographs. The Court has also never received a street map for the subdivision in 
question, and it is impossible to determine whether all of the homes shown in the photographs 
are actually located in this subdivision. As noted above, there was a question presented at the 
August 18 hearing about whether one home was even located in the subdivision. 
In determining whether the CC&R's have been abandoned, the Court must determine 
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restriction, will readily observe sufficient violations so that he or she will logically infer that the 
property owners neither adhere to nor enforce the restriction." Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649, 653 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). The Court must therefore be able to view the subdivision, either through 
photographs or by visiting the subdivision. Because the photographs have not been authenticated, 
there is no admissible evidence presented to the Court that allows the Court to view the 
subdivision, and the Court cannot determine whether the CC&R's have been abandoned or 
arbitrarily enforced. 
However, it is clear that if some homes share the same colors as those used by the 
defendant, and those homes were approved by the Design Review Committee while the 
defendant's was not, this Court could find that the Design Review Committee acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously. 
Because the defendant has not submitted evidence demonstrating that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether the CC&R's have been abandoned or arbitrarily enforced, the 
Court must DENY the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
B. Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
The plaintiff has correctly argued that the defendant has admitted that she did not obtain 
prior approval from the Design Review Committee. As noted above, the Court finds that the 
alterations made by the defendant do fall under the CC&R's for this subdivision, and two 
provisions of the CC&R's require homeowners to obtain approval from the Design Review 
Committee for alterations or improvements to the property. Therefore, it is clear that the 
defendant has violated at least one provision of the CC&R' s. 
The plaintiff also correctly noted in its reply memorandum that the defendant has set forth 
no admissible evidence to demonstrate that these provisions of the CC&R's have been 
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August 18 hearing. The plaintiff has argued that this affidavit should be stricken as untimely. The 
Court finds that it need not rule on the admissibility of Mr. Shepherd's affidavit, submitted 
by the defendant, because an affidavit submitted by the plaintiff demonstrates that the CC&R's 
may have been abandoned, and specifically that the requirement for prior approval of the Design 
Review Committee might have been abandoned. 
In Paul Mifsud's affidavit, dated April 21,2008, he states that "[t]o the extent other 
CC&R violations have been identified on other properties within the development, those 
violations are in the process of being appropriately remedied by the association." That statement 
clearly demonstrates that there are other violations in this subdivision. It is not clear how many 
violations there are, or when these violations occurred. If there are other violations, it is clear that 
the homeowners committing those violations did not obtain prior approval from the Design 
Review Committee. Therefore, the inference to be made from the plaintiffs own affidavit is that 
this provision of the CC&R's may well have been abandoned. All inferences must be interpreted 
in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 
Inc., 818 P.2d 997,1000 (Utah 1991). As noted by the defendant, the homeowner's association 
cannot simply resurrect CC&R's that have been abandoned, because once CC&R's have been 
abandoned, they are no longer enforceable. Therefore, the Court must determine whether the 
CC&R's have been abandoned, and it appeals that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to 
thatissue. 
The Court must therefore DENY the plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment 
C. Defendant's Motion to Strike Lis Pendens 
The final motion pending before the Court is the defendant's motion to strike the lis 
pendens. A notice of recording of lis pendens was filed by the plaintiff on December 17,2007. 
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of a lis pendens is appropriate. Specifically, a lis pendens can only be filed when an action affects 
"the title to, or the right of possession of, real property." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1303(l). The 
defendant has argued that because this current case can have no effect on her title to or 
possession of the property, the filing of a lis pendens was improper and the lis pendens should be 
stricken. 
The plaintiff has argued that case law from other states demonstrates that the words 
"affecting title to" have a broad meaning, and because this action may result in corrective action 
to the defendant's property, individuals who may have a future interest in the defendant's 
property (such as a prospective purchaser) should be put on notice that corrective action may be 
taken. The plaintiff cited the cases of Hammersley v. District Court, 610 P.2d 94 (Colo. 1980) 
and Tucson Estates, Inc., v. Superior Court, 729 P.2d 954 (Ariz. Ct App. 1986) in support of its 
position. 
It is true that both of those cases included analysis of statutes regarding the filing of a lis 
pendens which used language similar to that used in Utah's statute. In the cases cited by the 
plaintiff, the courts adopted a broad interpretation of the words "affect title in real property." The 
Colorado Supreme Court held that "although the present litigation does not seek to change 
ownership in any way, it does involve the determination of certain rights incident to ownership 
and in that sense affects title to real property." Hammersley, 610 P.2d 94, 96 (Colo. 1980). In 
Tucson Estates, Inc., the Arizona Court of Appeals specifically stated that it agreed with the 
analysis of the Colorado Supreme Court in the Hammersley case. 729 P.2d at 958. 
As noted by both parties, there is no Utah case law that addresses the relationship 
between a case involving CC&R's and the filing of a lis pendens.4 However, the Court has 
The Court searched for Utah cases addressing the issues presented in this case, and found only one case 
that involved CC&R's and a lis pendens. As noted by the plaintiff in a supplemental memorandum, the appellate 
court in that case conducted no analysis on the issues of the CC&R's and the lis pendens. Therefore, that sole Utah 
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discovered one case that includes language that appears to show that Utah courts should adopt 
the more liberal interpretation encouraged by the plaintiff. In Winters v. Schulman, the Utah 
y 
Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he recording of a lis pendens serves as a warning to all persons 
that any rights or interests they may acquire in the interim are subject to the judgment or 
decreed 977 P.2d 1218,1222 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (citingBagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 519 
P.2d 914,916 (Utah 1978)) (emphasis added). In the next sentence of the decision, however, the 
Utah Court of Appeals stated that "the primary purpose of section 78-40-2 is to provide 
prospective purchasers with notice of litigation affecting title to or possession of property located 
in Utah." That sentence, on its own, is merely a recitation of the language of the statute, and 
when the plain language of the statute is interpreted, it appears that the filing of a lis pendens is 
only appropriate in cases in which title to the property may change or the individual's right of 
possession may be taken away. 
Thus, this Court finds that the possibly contradictory language used by the Court of 
Appeals in Winters does not clearly demonstrate which approach this Court should take in 
interpreting the statute. However, after reviewing the case law from Colorado and Arizona, and 
noting that the purpose of a lis pendens is to apprise potential future owners of property of 
pending litigation involving the property, this Court finds that it should adopt the more liberal 
interpretation of the words "affecting the title to, or the right of possession of..." the property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B~6-1303(1). 
In this case, any rights a prospective purchaser would acquire would be subject to this 
Court's determination. For example, if the Court finds that the defendant violated the CC&R's 
and orders her to repaint portions of her home, and the defendant sells the home, the new owner 
would still be required to repaint those portions, of the home. It would be unfair to allow the new 
case is not helpful in addressing the issues presented in this case. * 
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owner to purchase the home without warning the new owner of the potential actions the new 
owner would be required to take, and avoiding that unfair result is the purpose of the filing of a 
lis pendens. 
The Court therefore finds that it is appropriate for a party to file a notice of lis pendens in 
a case in which alleged violations of CC&R's are at issue and corrective action could potentially 
be ordered by the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The plaintiffs cross-motion 
for summary judgment is also DENIED. 
The defendant's motion to strike hs pendens is DENIED, because the Court finds that the 
purpose of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1303 is best fulfilled by allowing a notice of hs pendens to 
be filed and thereby warn a prospective purchaser that he/she could be subject to the Court's 
judgment in this case. 
Date signed: )p 1 n 1 £)% 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
JONM.MEMMOTT 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




DENA STEWART; and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. i 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S RENEWED 
!
 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 070700680 
Judge Jon M. Memmott 
•. 
This matter is before the Court on the defendant's renewed motion for summary 
judgment The Court has reviewed the moving and responding papers, along with their 
supporting documentation. The Court also held a hearing on the matter on June 8, 2009. Having 
considered all of the arguments, being fiilly advised in the premises, and for the reasons set forth 
herein, the Court DENIES the defendant's motion. 
BACKGROUND 
The plaintiff filed its complaint in this matter on December 11,2007, claiming that the 
defendant's house violated the subdivision's restrictive covenants. Specifically, the plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant violated the restrictive covenants by: (1) installing dark shutters on her 
home's front exterior walls; (2) painting her garage door a dark color; (3) painting the entry to 
her home a dark color; (4) installing and/or painting her mailbox a dark color; and (5) installing 
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rocks on portions of her home's front exterior walls. On January 9,2008, the defendant filed her 
answer to the plaintiffs complaint, denying liability. 
Thereafter, on April 1,2008, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. In her 
accompanying supporting memorandum, the defendant argued that the subdivision's restrictive 
covenants did not regulate color, and that regardless, the colors of her home were harmonious 
with other homes in the subdivision. The defendant also asserted that the "rocks" on the exterior 
walls of her home were, in fact, bricks, and thus did not violate the restrictive covenants. To 
support her arguments, the defendant included several pictures of homes alleged to be within the 
subdivision, which she asserted demonstrated the harmonious quality of her home and argued 
that the plaintiff either discnminatorily enforced the subdivision's restrictive covenants or 
abandoned them altogether. 
The plaintiff filed its memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion on April 22, 
2008. In its opposition, the plaintiff argued that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding 
whether the restrictive covenants were discriminatorily enforced and/or abandoned. The plaintiff 
asserted that the pictures submitted by the defendant were not authenticated, and therefore were 
inadmissible. The plaintiff submitted that the restrictive covenants are uniformly applied 
throughout the subdivision and have not been abandoned. The plaintiff also asserted that the 
restrictive covenants placed architectural control of changes to the subdivision's homes in the 
subdivision's Design Review Committee and argued that because the defendant did not obtain 
permission to make the complained of changes to her home, she violated the restrictive 
covenants. The plaintiff then filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on April 24,2008, 
which argued the same. 
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On October 17,2008, following complete briefing of the parties' motion and cross-
motion and a hearing on the matters, the Court issued its ruling on the motions. In its ruling, the 
Court found that the subdivision's restrictive covenants do regulate changes to homes' colors and 
that the subdivision's Design Review Committee had the authority to determine whether 
proposed changes were harmonious and architecturally compatible with other homes in the 
subdivision. The Court noted, however, that it did not have the authority to override the 
Committee's determination of harmoniousness, but that it could only make a determination as to 
the issues of discriminatory enforcement and abandonment of the restrictive covenants. The 
Court then found that these issues were fact dependant and that because the defendant had not 
submitted competent evidence of the same, genuine issues of material fact existed, which 
precluded summary judgment on the defendant's motion. Further, the Court found that while the 
defendant did violate the restrictive covenants' provision requiring prior approval of changes, the 
evidence submitted demonstrated that other homeowners in the subdivision had also violated that 
requirement, which leads to the inference that the restrictive covenants may be discriminatorily 
enforced. Ultimately, however, the Court determined that evidence regarding the issue was 
lacking. Accordingly, the Court concluded that because genuine issues of material fact existed as 
to the issues of discriminatory enforcement and abandonment of the restrictive covenants, 
summary judgment was also inappropriate on the plaintiffs cross-motion. 
Subsequently, on January 29,2008, Ihe defendant renewed her motion for summary 
judgment. In her supporting memorandum, the defendant reasserted her prior arguments 
regarding discriminatory enforcement and abandonment of the subdivision's restrictive 
covenants. The defendant again also submitted pictures of the subdivision's homes to support of 
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her arguments. These pictures were attached as exhibits to the Affidavit of Shaun Shepherd. 
Particularly, the defendant asserted that the home on the "Clubhouse Property" in the subdivision 
is subject to the restrictive covenants, but nevertheless, did not comply with the harmonious and 
architecturally compatible requirements the plaintiff seeks to enforce in this litigation. 
Accordingly, the defendant submitted that because the plaintiff did not take the necessary steps 
to ensure the Clubhouse Property's compliance with the restrictive covenants, considered in 
conjunction with the subdivision's other homes' violations, the subdivision's restrictive 
covenants must have either been abandoned or discriminatorily enforced. 
On March 23,2009, the plaintiff filed its memorandum in opposition to the defendant's 
renewed motion for summary judgment.2 In its opposition, the plaintiff argued that despite the 
defendant's authentication of the previously submitted pictures of the subdivision's homes, the 
pictures still do not establish that no material issues of fact exist regarding the issues of 
abandonment and/or discriminatory enforcement of the restrictive covenants. The plaintiff 
1
 In his affidavit, Mr. Shepherd indicated that he had taken the pictures and that each depicted a home within the 
subdivision, as shown by the addresses and lot numbers accompanying the picture exhibits. The picture exhibits also 
included Mr. Shepherd's commentary regarding the homes' features and what he believed were violations of the 
subdivision's restrictive covenants. 
2
 On February 17,2009, the plaintiff filed a motion to stay briefing and determination of the defendant's renewed 
motion for summary judgment In its accompanying supporting memorandum, the plaintiff asserted that an 
automatic stay of proceedings was necessary due to the defendant's filing for bankruptcy. On March 4,2009, die 
defendant filed a reply to the plaintiffs motion to stay, arguing that a stay was unnecessary and that the plaintiff's 
motion should be treated as its response to her renewed motion. On March 5, 2009, the plaintiff filed a request to 
submit for decision regarding its motion to stay. Subsequently, on March 9,2009, the defendant filed a notice to 
submit for decision regarding her renewed motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff objected to the defendant's 
notice to submit on March 10,2009, asserting that briefing was not complete and that the Court's determination on 
its motion to stay would affect when its response to the defendant's renewed motion is due. The defendant filed a 
response to the plaintiff's objection on March 13,2009. In her response, the defendant asserted that her bankruptcy 
filing had been withdrawn and that the plaintiff's response to her renewed motion should be filed "forthwith." On 
the same day, the plaintiff filed a suggestion of mootness regarding its motion to stay and indicated that its response 
to the defendant's renewed motion would be filed by March 23,2009. On April 17,2009, the Court issued its ruling 
on the plaintiff's motion to stay, finding that the motion was moot Due to die procedural complexities resulting 
from die defendant's bankruptcy filing and the plaintiff's motion to stay, and the defendant's subsequent willingness 
to accept the plaintiff's potentially untimely memorandum in opposition as demonstrated in her response to the 
plaintiff's objection to her request to submit and the filing of subsequent pleadings, the Court will accept the 
plaintiff's memorandum in opposition and consider it as a timely response to the defendant's renewed motion. 
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disputed whether the subdivision's restrictive covenants applied to the Clubhouse Property due 
to its initial common ownership between the subdivision and an adjacent condominium project. 
The plaintiff also addressed the compliance of each of the homes depicted in the defendant's 
picture exhibits. The plaintiff averred that the issues of abandonment and discriminatory 
enforcement of the restrictive covenants are fact intensive and not appropriate for summary 
judgment in this matter. The plaintiff then requested the Court deny the defendant's motion and 
allow the parties to conduct discovery on the abandonment and discriminatory enforcement 
issues.3 
On April 8,2009, the defendant filed her reply memorandum in support of her renewed 
motion for summary judgment, hi her reply, the defendant asserted that it is unclear who owned 
or presently owns the Clubhouse Property from the submitted documents; nevertheless, the 
defendant posited that since the home on the property is not a multi-family structure, unlike the 
adjacent condominium project, and lies on the subdivision's side of the street, the Clubhouse 
Property must be subject to the subdivision's restrictive covenants.4 Further, the defendant 
asserted that her picture exhibits clearly demonstrate that the home on the Clubhouse Property is 
3
 Also on March 23,2009, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike portions of the Affidavit of Shaun Shepherd. In its 
accompanying supporting memorandum, the plaintiff argued that Mr. Shepherd's commentary within the picture 
exhibits regarding the depicted homes' compliance with the subdivision's restrictive covenants is inadmissible due 
to lack of foundation, hearsay and Mr. Shepherd making improper legal conclusions. In her response to the 
plaintiff's motion to strike, filed April 8,2009, the defendant asserted that the plaintiffs dispute of Mr. Shepherd's 
commentary was irrelevant, as the plaintiff did not question the accuracy of the pictures. On April 17,2009, the 
plaintiff filed a request to submit for decision regarding its motion to strike. The defendant objected to the plaintiff's 
request to submit on April 30,2009, arguing that the matter should be addressed and decided in conjunction with her 
renewed motion for summary judgment In the Court's review Mr. Shepherd's affidavit, it appears that the 
commentary included with the picture exhibits, as well as the list of violations exhibit, lack foundation and draw 
improper legal conclusions. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the plaintiff's motion to strike as to those portions of 
Mr. Shepherd's affidavit 
4
 Notably, the defendant makes her argument that the Clubhouse Property must be subject to the subdivision's 
restrictive covenants admittedly without reviewing the actual special warranty deed that conveyed the home on the 
Clubhouse Property to its cuirent owner. The defendant merely assumes that the special warranty deed is "in the 
usual form" and "excepts rights previously conveyed" to the adjacent condominium project See Reply to 
Opposition to Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, 3-4. Further, this document was not submitted to the Court 
for review. 
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not harmonious with the subdivision's other homes and that the number and type of violations on 
the subdivision's other homes establishes that the restrictive covenants were either abandoned or 
are discriminatorily enforced. Finally, the defendant submitted that the plaintiff's attempts at 
redefining the restrictive covenants' requirements create an arbitrary and capricious standard 
upon which the subdivision's Design Review Committee may withhold its permission to make 
changes to the subdivision's homes. Accordingly, the defendant argued that even if the 
restrictive covenants are not abandoned, the unfettered discretion given to the Committee is 
impermissible and per se discriminatory enforcement 
On April 21,2009, the defendant filed a notice to submit for decision regarding her 
renewed motion for summary judgment and requested a hearing on the matter. The Court held 
such hearing on June 8,2009. At this hearing, the parties reasserted their prior arguments and the 
Court took the matter under advisement. Accordingly, the Court finds the defendant's renewed 
motion for summary judgment is now ripe for determination.5 
ANALYSIS 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). However, "the evidence and all inferences that may be 
reasonably drawn from the evidence must be liberally construed in favor of the party opposing 
the motion" Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997,1000 (Utah 1991). 
* On July 14,2009, the plaintiff filed a notice of bankruptcy filing regarding the defendant This notice indicated that 
the defendant filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy on June 15, 2009. On July 27,2009, the defendant filed an objection 
to the plaintiffs notice, asserting that a stay in proceedings is unnecessary and should not be used to delay the 
Court's ruling on her renewed motion. The Court finds that since the matter was taken under advisement prior to the 
defendant's bankruptcy filing and in the interest of moving this litigation forward, such filing will not stay the 
Court's determination on the renewed motion. However, the Court shall stay proceedings in this case following the 
issuance of this Ruling. 
Page 6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Restrictive covenants are a common method of effectuating private residential 
developmental schemes." Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 813 (Utah 2000). "As a general 
proposition, property owners who have purchased laud [sic] in a subdivision, subject to a 
recorded set of restrictive covenants and conditions, have the right to enforce such restrictions 
through equitable relief against property owners who do not comply with the stated restrictions." 
Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649,652 (Utah Ct App. 1995). "Conduct by property owners within a 
development, however, may terminate and render unenforceable a particular covenant where 
such conduct so substantially changes the character of the neighborhood as to neutralize the 
benefit of the covenant, or constitutes evidence of the abandonment of the covenant" Swenson, 
998 P.2d at 813 (Internal citations omitted). 
"The case law is uniform that before an abandonment of a covenant may be found there 
must be substantial and general noncompliance with the covenant" Swenson, 998 P.2d at 813 
(Internal quotations omitted). "The violations must be so substantial as to destroy the usefulness 
of the covenant and support a finding that the covenant has become burdensome." Id. However, 
"[i]f the original purpose of the covenant can still be accomplished and substantial benefit will 
continue to inure to residents, the covenant will stand." Id. "Courts are uniform that no 
abandonment of a covenant will be found where violations are of a minor nature and do not 
destroy the general building scheme, if the violations are slight, unimportant, and unsubstantial, 
or if the violations are inoffensive." Id. (Internal quotations and citations omitted). Further, 
"[e]vidence of abandonment must be established by clear and convincing evidence." Id} 
The test for abandonment, "[i]n simplest terms, is met when the average person, upon 
inspection of a subdivision and knowing of a certain restriction, will readily observe sufficient 
6
 It is also noteworthy that the "[abandonment of one covenant does not suggest abandonment of other, albeit 
similar, covenants in the agreement" Fink, 896 PJ2d at 655. 
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violations so that he or she will logically infer that the property owners neither adhere to nor 
enforce the restriction." Fink, 896 P.2d at 653 (Internal quotations omitted). The Utah Supreme 
Court has adopted a three-part test for determining whether a subdivision has abandoned its 
restrictive covenant, to wit: 
"[Courts] must examine: (1) the 'number, nature and severity of the then 
existing violations'; (2) 'any prior act of enforcement of the restriction'; 
and (3) 'whether it is still possible to realize to a substantial degree the 
benefits intended through the covenant.'" 
Swenson, 998 P.2d at 814 (quoting Fink, 896 P.2d at 653-54). In discussing the application of 
this three-part test, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated that: 
"To maximize the benefits of the essentially objective quality of this test, 
courts applying it should first analyze violations as to their number, 
nature, and severity. If these elements alone are sufficient to lead the 
average person to believe the covenant has been abandoned, it is not 
necessary to go further. However, if abandonment is still in doubt, courts 
should then consider the other two factors—namely, prior enforcement 
efforts and possible realization of benefits-to resolve the abandonment 
question." 
Fm£,896P.2dat653.7 
Here5 the defendant seeks summary judgment on the issues of whether the subdivision's 
restrictive covenants regarding the color of shutters, garage doors, entrances to homes, and 
mailboxes, as well as the installation of rocks on a home's front exterior walls, have been 
abandoned and/or discriminatorily enforced, thus calling for the dismissal of the plaintiffs 
claims against her. The plaintiff on the other hand, argues that the restrictive covenants have not 
been abandoned nor discriminatorily enforced, but regardless, genuine issues of material fact 
exist, which preclude summary judgment. 
Additionally, and irrespective of the abandonment issue, a subdivision's enforcement of its restrictive covenants 
may not be made in a discriminatory manner. In this respect, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated that, "[o]f course, 
an architectural committee's decisions made in the course of the approval or denial of prospective house plans and 
specifications must be reasonable and made in good faith and must not be arbitrary or capricious." Fink, 896 P.2d at 
655 n.7. 
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To support her arguments, and in an attempt to demonstrate that the subdivision's 
restrictive covenants have been abandoned and/or discriminatorily enforced, the defendant has 
submitted several pictures of the subdivision's homes. While these picture exhibits were 
authenticated by the Affidavit of Shaun Shepherd, unlike with their previous submission in 
. defendant's original motion for summary judgment, the Court finds that these pictures alone do 
not demonstrate by number, nature and severity, evidence sufficient to lead the average person to 
believe the restrictive covenants at issue have been abandoned. 
First, with respect to flhe restrictive covenants regarding the color of shutters, garage 
doors, entrances to homes, and mailboxes, the picture exhibits do show that some homes in the 
subdivision appear to violate the restrictive covenants' harmonious color standard.8 Specifically, 
the picture exhibits show that fifteen (15) of the subdivision's forty-eight (48) completed homes,9 
including the defendant's home (lot 109), have darker colored front doors and/or front 
-% 
entrances.10 It also appears that fourteen (14) of the homes have darker colored trim and/or two-
toned bricks.11 Further, three (3) of the homes, as depicted, have mailboxes that are darker 
colored.12 Additionally, a dark colored wooden deck appears on one (1) property, a green chain-
link fence appears on one (1) property, two (2) homes have green-striped awnings above 
windows, and one (1) home has a copper valance above a window.13 However, the defendant's 
home appears to be the only home in the subdivision with dark colored wooden shutters, a 
8
 It is noteworthy, however, that many of the defendant's picture exhibits do not adequately depict the areas of the 
subdivision's homes that are relevant to this matter. Specifically, several of.the picture exhibits do not show a clear 
view of the homes' front entrances, mailboxes or garages. 
9
 Three (3) of the properties depicted in the defendant's picture exhibits include unfinished homes and a vacant lot, 
and thus do not aid in die Court's abandonment or discriminatory enforcement determination. See Affidavit of 
Shaun Shepherd, Exhibit 1, lots 201,413, and414. 
10Seeld., lots 109,206,302,309,310,311,312,401,407/408,415,504, 507,509,510, and511. 
11
 See Id^ lots 105/106,107,203,304,307,308,408, 501,502,503, 504, 505,506, and 507. 
12
 See Id., lots 109,302, and 303. 
13
 See Id^ lots 108,403,405f 406, and 512. 
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non-white garage door, and rock-like trim.14 Further, while the number of homes with darker 
colored front doors and/or front entrances and trim and/or two-toned bricks is significant, the 
nature and severity of the darker colors do not appear to be as severe as that of the defendant's 
home. Accordingly, the Court finds that the picture exhibits submitted by the defendant leave 
doubt as to the abandonment of the restrictive covenants at issue. Simply put, it cannot be said 
that the violations are so substantial and widespread that the Court's analysis need not go beyond 
the first-prong of the abandonment test. Therefore, because the Court finds that the evidence 
submitted does not sufficiently establish abandonment under the first-prong of the abandonment 
test, the Court must consider the next two (2) prongs of the test. See Fink, 896 P.2d at 653. 
The second prong of the abandonment test relates to any prior acts of enforcement of the 
restrictive covenants. See Swenson, 998 P.2d at 814 (quoting Fink, 896 P.2d at 653-54). Here, the 
defendant's argument primarily relies on the noncompliance of the home on the Clubhouse 
Property. As depicted in the defendant's picture exhibits, the Clubhouse Property home appears 
clearly different from the homes in the subdivision. See Affidavit of Shaun Shepherd, Exhibit 4. 
The Clubhouse Property home contains rock-like trim, darker colored wooden doors and/or 
shutters, and a darker colored garage door. However, the parties dispute whether the 
subdivision's restrictive covenants apply to the Clubhouse Property home. Further, the parties 
have not provided the Court with the necessary documentation for it render a decision on 
whether the Clubhouse Property home is subject to the subdivision's restrictive covenants. 
Specifically, and as acknowledged and argued by the defendant in her reply memorandum, the 
abstract of documents submitted by the plaintiff while showing what documents have been 
14
 The Court notes that the parties have not submitted competent evidence as to whether the trim on the defendant's 
home is, in fact, rock or whether it is merely brick made to look like rock. Accordingly, the Court finds that this feet 
remains in dispute. 
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recorded on the property, does not show the content or affect of such documents. Moreover, the 
defendant's assumptions regarding the contents of documents within the property's chain of title, 
in particular the special warranty deed that conveyed the Clubhouse Property home to its current 
owner, are insufficient for the Court properly construe the myriad of deeds and agreements that 
potentially affect whether the Clubhouse Property home is subject to the subdivision's restrictive 
covenants. Accordingly, the Court finds that material issues of feet exist regarding the 
applicability of the Clubhouse Property home's appearance to the Court's determination of 
abandonment and/or discriminatory enforcement of the restrictive covenants. 
Additionally, neither party has submitted competent evidence regarding specific acts of 
prior enforcement of the restrictive covenants at issue. The Court's ruling on the parties' prior 
motion and cross-motion for summary judgjnent found that it was clear that not all homeowners 
in the subdivision obtained prior approval for the changes to their homes. However, the plaintiff 
has alleged that the owners of those homes exhibiting violations were notified of the violations, 
and that such violations are being remedied. See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit G. Nevertheless, this after-the-fact attempt to 
enforce the restrictive covenants likely may not be sufficient to withstand an abandonment 
finding. See Fink, 896 P.2d at 654 ("Given the significant number of houses with nonconforming 
roofing materials in Maple Hills, uniformity of development-at least with respect to that 
particular design element—cannot be accomplished by belated enforcement of the covenant."). 
Further, while the defendant has made informal requests for information pertaining to prior acts 
of enforcement, these requests were not made as part of formal discovery and the Court has not 
been provided with relevant information or admissible evidence on the issue. Accordingly, the 
Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist as to the prior acts of enforcement of the 
Page 11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
subdivision's restrictive covenants and the second-prong of the abandonment test may not be 
determined at this time.15 
Similarly, the parties have presented no evidence as to the third-prong of the 
abandonment test, i.e. whether it is still possible to realize to a substantial degree the benefits 
intended through the covenant, and have made little to no argument, beyond conclusory 
statements, regarding the same. The Court therefore finds that genuine issues of material fact 
exist as to the third-prong of the abandonment test with regard to the restrictive covenants at 
issue in this matter. 
Accordingly, because the Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist as to the 
issues of abandonment and discriminatory enforcement of the subdivision's restrictive 
covenants, the Court must DENY the defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment,16 
15
 The foregoing analysis is equally applicable to the defendant's argument that the subdivision's restrictive 
covenants have been discriminatorily enforced. While it is true that the harmonious standard applied by the 
subdivision's Design Review Committee has subjective elements, it is unclear to the Court whether the Committee 
has established protocols and standards for making their determinations and whether the Committee has actually 
foUowed such protocols and standards. Competent evidence on these issues is simply lacking. Accordingly, the 
Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist as to the defendant's argument that the subdivision's restrictive 
covenants are discriminatorily enforced However, the Court again notes, as it did in its prior ruling on the parties' 
motion and cross-motion for summary judgment, that if some of the subdivision's homes that share similar colors to 
those of the defendant's home were approved by the subdivision's Design Review Committee while the defendant's 
was not, the Court could find that the restrictive covenants were arbitrarily and capriciously enforced. 
16
 The Court notes at this time that parties' respective positions regarding the restrictive covenants at issue in this 
matter are relatively weak. It appears to the Court that some of the restrictive covenants at issue may likely have 
been abandoned and/or discriminatorily enforced, while others have not Over a year ago, the Court urged the parties 
to make a good faith attempt to resolve this matter through settlement It is evident that such an effort was not made. 
Given the factual disputes and evidence submitted, the Court again urges the parties to entry into good faith 
settlement negotiations to resolve this matter. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court DENIES the defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment 
Additionally, consistent with the defendant's bankruptcy filing, the Court shall stay proceedings 
in this matter pending the defendant's bankruptcy action The Court directs the plaintiff to 
prepare and submit an order that is consistent with and reflects this Ruling. 
Date signed: l l 3 \ t f / \ . 
:xJf\ (fw^r DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
JONM.MEMMOTT 
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to the following on this date: (_ Ua^x 
E. Craig Smay 
E. Craig Smay, P.C. 
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WOOD JENKINS LLC 
Richard J. Armstrong, No. 7461 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 366-6060 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
BARTON WOODS HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah corporation, ; 
Plaintiff, \ 
v. ] 




) Civil No. 070700680 
i Judge Robert Dale 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion: (1) to Dismiss 
Plaintiff's Complaint and Defendant's Counterclaims Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 41; or, in the 
Alternative, (2) for Summary Judgment on all Claims and Counterclaims, and Defendant's 
Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motions"). Having reviewed the written and oral 
arguments in support of and in opposition to the Motions, and being otherwise fully advised on 
the matter, the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion: (1) to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and Defendant's 
Counterclaims Pursuant to UtahR. Civ. P. 41; or, in the Alternative, (2) for Summary Judgment 
on all Claims and Counterclaims is GRANTED. 
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3. This action, including all claims and counterclaims, is dismissed with 
prejudice, with each party to bear their own costs and attorney's fees. 
DATED this ffV day of December, 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
/NU<£/ 
Honorable Robert Dale 
Second District Court 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7th day of December, 2010. a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER was served via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
E. Craig Smay 
E. CRAIG SMAY, P.C. 
174 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Counterclaim Plaintiff 
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E. Craig Smay #2985 
174 E. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone Number (801) 539-8515 
Fax Number (801) 539-8544 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
BARTON WOODS HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENA STEWART, an individual, and 
JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 070700680 
Judge Robert Dale 
Notice is hereby given that Defendant Stewart appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final 
judgment of Honorable Robert Dale entered in this matter December 22,2010. The appeal is 
taken from the entire judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this 11 th day of January, 2011. 
U^A 
E. Craig Smay, Attorney for Defendar 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing "NOTICE OF APPEAL", 
was sent on the 11th of January, 2011, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
David J. Crapo 
Richard J. Armstrong 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 366-6060 
E. Craig Smay, Attorney 
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ENABLING DECLARATION OF COVENANTS, / 
CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS OF / 
BARTON WOODS PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT 
THIS ENABLING DECLARATION OF COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND 
RESTRICTIONS is made and executed this /f day of 
199 3, by Bartonwood Limited Liability Company, a Utah Lino.ted 
Liability Company, hereinafter referred to as "DECLARANT." 
R E C I T A L S : 
A. Declarant is the sole owner of that certain parcel of 
real property (sometimes referred to herein as the "Declarant's 
Property"),"" situated in Davis County, Utah, and more particularly 
described as: 
i *» 
: m Beginning at the Northwest Corner of Lot 61 of 
> ® Lakeview Terrace Subdivision in Bountiful City, Davis : 
' £ County, Utah, which point is N 0 :04'30"E 393.91 ft. along 
) jo the Section Line and East- 244.18 ft. from the West 
I p Quarter Corner of Section 28, T.2N., R-.IE., S.L.B.&M. and 
h _J running thence along the boundary of Lot 62 of said 
ft 2 Lakeview Terrace Subdivision in the following nine 
£ •£• courses: Northeasterly 207.33 ft. along the arc of a 
0 ° 420.00 ft. radius curve to the right through a central 
1 I angle of 2B°L6 ,59" (radius point bears S 87°24 ,56 WE from 
? | the point of beginning), Northeasterly 253.12 ft. along 
• 6 the arc of a 280.00 ft. radius curve to the left through 
h a central angel of 51°47'44" (radius point bears N 
1 -» 59°07 ,57 WW from the beginning of the curve), N 82 044 ,33"E 
^ 2 154.42 ft., N 74°50'01 ME 181.72 ft.f N 77°55,11,,E 292.54 
5 xn ft., S 72°14,20"E 399.28 ft., S 0°24 ,05"W 803.99 ft., 
3 -3 Southwesterly 122.36 ft. along the arc of a 370.88 ft. 
- o radius- curve to the right through a central angle of 
£ *J 18°54'12" (radius point bears N 18°40 ,42 MW from the 
*£ ^  beginning of the curve), Southwesterly 257.69 ft. along 
-J -* the arc of a 1,808.83 ft. radius curve to the left 
R u) through a central angle of 8°09 ,45 H (radius point bears 
•g-rj S 01°13'30 "W from the beginning of the curve to the 
*rc* Southeast Corner of Lakeview Terrace Condominiums Phase 
n P" 1; thence along the boundary of said Phase i in the 
J r* following four courses: N 1°01'30"W 63.00 ft., N 
> (^  65°58'30 ME 130.27 ft., N ll o50'50"W 112.56 ft., Westerly 
%£ 115.15 ft. along the arc of a 340.00 ft. radius curve to 
Q% the right through a central an^le of 19°24'20" (radius 
*§ * point bears .N 11°50,50HW. from the beginning of the 
~ 3 curve); thence N 7°33'30"E 54.70 ft. along the extended 
{ boundary of said Phase 1; thence N 87°47 ,30 WE 64.44 ft.? 
« thence N 2°12 ,30 MW 25.09 ft.; thence N 2°12'30 WW 94.91 3 r%4-6fe7-ooa3 
i 
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ft.; thence S 87°47'31"W 85.00 ft.; thence N 47°12'3l"W 
38.46 ft.; thence S 42°13*30"W 87.00 ft.; thence S 
2°12'30ME 25.00 ft.; thence N 87o47'30HE 13.00 ft.; 
thence S 2°12'30"E 25.00 ft; thence S 2°11'48,,W 33.37 
ft.; thence along the boundary of Lakeview Terrace 
Condominiums Phase 1 in the following four courses: S 
26°42'30MW 24.00 ft., Northwesterly 122.19 ft. along the 
arc of a 300.00 ft. radius curve to the right through a. 
central angle of 23°20'10" (radius point bears N 
26o42'30"E from the beginning of the curve), S 50°02,40"W> 
133.00 ft., S 14°51'10"E 170.04 ft. to the Northeast 
Corner of Lot 55 of said Lakeview Terrace Subdivision; 
thence N-86°38'38"W 68.72 ft.; N 70°01'46"W 69.11 ft.; 
thence N'44°28 '23"W 13.4.94 ft.; thence N 33051'54"W 66.65 
ft.; thence N 14o33'09"W 65.87 ft.; thence N 4°42'29"W 
67.20 ft.to the Northeast Corner of said Lot 61; thence 
N 87024'56MW 130.14 ft. along the North line of said Lot 
61 to the Point of Beginning. 
*^ V-//-7-^JJ 
Containing 16.4679 acres. 
B. The Declarant's Property is contiguous to a parcel of 
real property, known as Lakeview Terrace Condominiums Phase Nq. 1, 
containing various improvements (sometimes referred to herein as 
the "Phase I Properties"), more fully described as: 
Lakeview Terrace Condominiums Phase No. 1, as the same is 
defined and established and identified on the record of 
survey map of Lakeview Terrace (Phase 1) duly recorded in 
the office of the County Recorder of Davis County, Utahf 
on November 11, 1979, as Entry No. 550443, and in the 
Enabling Declaration of Lakeview Terrace Condominium 
Phase No. 1, dated July 16, 1979, recorded November 11, 
1979, as Entry No. 550444, in Book 801, at Page 487, of „ 
official records"of Davis County, Utah. 
Together with an undivided interest in and to the common 
areas as the same are established and identified in the 
maps and declarations referred to hereinabove. 
The real property underlying the Phase 1 Properties has been more 
fully described as: 
Beginning at the point of reverse curve on the North line 
of Lakeview Drive (radius point bears South 13°47'08" 
East) said point being South B ? ^ ^ " East 763.50 feet 
from the West 1/4 corner of Section. 28, Township 2 North, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence easterly along the arc of an 1608.83 foot radius 
curve to the:right 177.52 feet; thence North 01°15' West 
63.00 feet; thence North 65045l East 130.27 feet; thence 
8232.BA7692.1 - 2 -
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North ^(M^O"'West 112.564 feet along a radial line to 
a point on a 340.00 foot rad.\us curve to the right; 
thence westerly along the arc of said curve 115.155 feet; 
thence North 07°20' East 24.00 feet along a radial line 
to a point on a 316.00 foot radius curve to the right; 
thence westerly along the arc of said curve 52.12 feet to 
the point of tangent with a 276.00 radius curve to the 
right (radius bears North 16°47' East); thence westerly 
along the arc of said curve 46.726 feet; thence South . 
26°29' West 24.00 feet along a radial line to a point on 
a 300.00 foot radius curve to the right; thence westerly 
along the arc of said curve 122.188 feet; thence South 
49°49f10M West 133.00 feet; thence South 15°04%AO" East 
170.04 feet; thence South 00°12'44" West 123.07 feet 
along the East line of Lot 55, Lakeview Terrace to the 
Southeast corner of said Lot 55; thence easterly along 
the arc of a 420.00 foot radius curve to the left (radius 
point bears North 00°12,44" East) 102.61 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
C Declarant's property is also contiguous to a parcel 
of real property designated for a clubhouse and related common 
amenities (the -Clubhouse Property"), title to which is vested 
in Lakeview Terrace Unit Owners Association, a Utah non-profit 
corporation, and which property has been more.fully described as: 
Beginning at a point South 87°24,5M East 855.26 feet-and 
North 5°I6'25" West 317.28 feet from the West quarter 
corner, of Section 28, Township 2 North, Range 1 Eas/t, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 
1°58,15M East 33.37 feet; thence North 2°26' West 25 
feet; thence South 87°34' West 13 feet; thence North 
2°26' West 25 feet; thence North 42°0r East 87 feet; 
thence South•47°26l East 38.46 feet; thence North 87°34' \ 
East 85 feet; thence South 2°26' East 120 feet; thence 
South" 87°34' West 64.44 feet; thence South 7°20' West 
-30.70 feet to a point on a 316 foot radius curve to the 
right (radius point bears North 7°20f East); thence 
westerly along the arc of said curve 52.12 feet to the 
point of tangency with a 276 foot radius curve to the 
right; thence westerly along the arc of said curve 46.726 
feet to the point of beginning. 
D. Declarant desires to include within the Planned Unit 
Development on the Declarant's Property certain improvements and 
related common amenities, the locations and specifications of which 
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are contained in the Of f i c ia l Subdivis ion Plat Map for the e n t i r e 
Planned Unit Development e s t a b l i s h e d hereby. 
E. Declarant a l so d e s i r e s , subject to terms acceptable to 
Declarant, to enter into an agreement or agreements between or 
among the owners of the Declarant 's Property, the Phase i 
Propert ies and the Clubhouse Property for common use , maintenance, 
m.anagement and operation of the Clubhouse Property. 
F. The Declarant d e s i r e s , by recording th i s Declarat ion, to 
submit a l l of the Declarant's Property, described in Paragraph A 
above, to ' the terms of t h i s Declarat ion, to vacate and supersede in 
t h e i r e n t i r e t y a l l prior covenants , conditions and r e s t r i c t i o n s 
a f f e c t i n g the Declarant's Proper t i e s , and to provide for 
establ ishment of an incorporated homeowner's a s soc ia t ion t o hold 
t i t l e t o , and otherwise to contract for use of, common proper t i e s 
and improvements for the b e n e f i t of the owners of the e n t i r e 
p a r c e l . 
. G. Declarant has obtained the acknowledgment and consent to 
t h i s Declaration from a l l record owners of the Dec larant ' s 
P r o p e r t i e s , as wel l as the consent from a l l p a r t i e s p o s s e s s i n g 
l i e n s , i f any, a f fec t ing any port ion of that property which, by: 
t h e i r execution of t h i s Agreement, or t h e i r consents on record with 
t h e Davis County Recorder, hereby jo in in the submission of the 
Declarant 's Properties to the terms of t h i s Declaration. 
H. Declarant intends t o provide that the individual l o t s 
l o c a t e d within the projec t , together with the undivided ownership 
i n t e r e s t in the common areas and f a c i l i t i e s as s p e c i f i e d h e r e i n , 
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shall hereafter be subject to the covenants, restrictions, 
reservations, assessments, charges and liens herein set forth; 
NOW, THEREFORE, Declarant hereby declares that certain parcel 
of real property described in Article II, below, shall be held, 
sold, conveyed and occupied subject to the following easements, 
restrictions, covenants, conditions, assessments, charges and 
liens, which are for the purposes of protecting the value and 
desirability of the subject property and which shall be construed 
as covenants of equitable servitude and shall run with the subject 
property and be binding on all parties having any rights, title or 
interest in that subject property or any part thereof, their heirs, 
successors and assigns, and shall inure to the benefit of each 
owner thereof. • . -. * 
-ARTICLE I 
DEFINITIONS 
When used in this Declaration, including the recitals 
hereto, the following terms shall have the meaning indicated: 
1.1 Association: Barton Woods, Inc., a Utah Non-Prof it . 
Corporation, formed for management of the Project .and more fully 
described in Article IV, below. -
1.2 Declarant: Bartonwood Limited Liability Company, 
a Utah limited liability company, and its successors-in-interest 
and specific assignees-in-interest to rights and obligations under 
this Declaration. 
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.1.3 Declaration; This Enabling * Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of Barton Woods Planned Unit 
Development and all amendments hereto. 
1.4 Lot; Each individual lot within the Project, as 
shown on the Map, which lot may or may not be improved and which 
may or may not include improvements of the type designated on the 
Map and/or authorized by Bountiful City, Utah. 
1.5 Management Committee and Committee; The Board of 
Trustees of the Association, or a management committee specifically 
designated as such by the Board of Trustees of the Association. 
The Committee shall have and exercise the rights, powers and 
responsibilities designated and delegated in this Declaration and 
in the Articles of Incorporation, * the By-Laws and rules and 
regulations of the Association. 
1.6 Manager; The person or entity designated by the 
Association to manage the Project. 
1.7 Map; The official subdivision plat map filed and 
recorded in the Official Records of the Davis County Recorder. 
1.8 Mortgage; Deed of Trust as well as a mortgage. 
1.9 Mortgagee; Beneficiary or holder under Deed of 
Trust as well as a mortgage. 
1.10 Owner; Any person with an ownership interest in a 
lot, together with the undivided interest in the common areas as 
defined herein. 
1.11 Person; Legal entity as well as natural person. 
1.12 Project; Barton Woods Planned Unit Development. 
.. • * 
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• 1.13 Subject Property: The real property underlying the 
Projec t , described in Art ic l e II below. 
ARTICLE II 
GRANT AND SUBMISSION 
Declarant hereby submits to the provisions of this 
Declaration, and to the covenants, conditions, restrictions, 
reservations, assessment charges and liens hereunder,-that certain 
real property (the "Subject Property") situated in Davis County, 
Utah, and more fully described as: 
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of Lot 
'6"i of Lakeview Terrace Subdivision in- Bountiful 
City, Davis County,, Utah, which point is N 
0°04,30,,E 393.91 ft. along the Section Line and 
East 244.18 ft. from the West Quarter Corner of 
Section 28, T.2N., R.1E., S.L.B.&M. and running 
thence along the boundary of Lot 62 of said 
Lakeview Terrace Subdivision in the following 
nine courses: Northeasterly 207.33 ft. along the 
arc of a 420.00 ft. radius curve to the right 
through a central angle of 28°16,59" (radius 
point bears S 87°24,56,,E from the point of 
beginning), Northeasterly 253.12 ft. along the 
arc of a 280.00 ft. radius curve to the left 
through a central angel of 51°47,44M (radius 
point bears N 59°07'57"W from the beginning of 
the curve), N 82°44«33ME 154.42 ft., N 
74°50*01ME 181.72 ft., N.77°55'11"E 292.54 ft., 
S 72°14,20HE 399.28 ft., S 0°24,05,,W 803.99 ft., 
Southwesterly 122.36 ft. along the arc of a 
370.88 ft. radius curve to the right through- a 
central angle of 18054'12" (radius point bears 
N 18o40,42"W from the beginning of the"curve), 
Southwesterly 257.69 ft. along the arc of a 
1,808.83 ft. radius curve to the left through a 
central angle of 8°09,45M (radius point bears S 
01 ° 13'30 "W from the beginning of the curve to 
the Southeast Corner of Lakeview Terrace 
Condominiums Phase 1; thence along the boundary 
of said Phase 1 in the following four courses: 
N 1°01,30WW 63.00 ft., N 65°58,30"E 130.27 ft., 
N ll°50,50,fW 112.56 ft., Westerly 115.15 ft. 
along the arc of a 340.00 ft. radius curve to 
the right through a central angle of l g ^ ^ O " 
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(radius point bears N 11°50'50"W from the 
beginning of the curve); thence N 7°33'30"E 
54.70 ft. along the extended boundary of said 
Phase 1; thence N 87°47'30"E 64.44 ft.; thence 
N 2°12'30"W 25.09 ft.; thence N 2°12'30"W 94.91 
ft.; thence S 87°47,31MW 85.00 ft.; thence N 
47°12'31"W 38.46 ft.; thence S 42°13'30"W 87.00 
ft.; thence S 2°12,30"E 25.00 ft.; thence N 
87°47'30"E 13.00 ft.; thence S 2°12'30ME 25.00 
ft; thence S 2°ll'48nW 33.37 ft.; thence along 
the boundary of Lakeview Terrace Condominiums 
Phase 1 in the following four courses: S 
26°42'30"W 24.00 ft., Northwesterly 122.19 ft. 
along the arc of a 300.00 ft. radius curve" to 
the right through a central angle of 23°20'10" 
(radius point bears N 26°42'30"E from the 
beginning of the curve), S 50o02'40"W 133.00 
ft., S 14°51'10"E 170.04 ft. to the Northeast 
Corner of Lot 55 of said Lakeview Terrace 
Subdivision; thence N 86°38'38"'W 68.72 ft.; N 
70°01'46"W 69.11 ft.; thence N 44°28'23"W 134.94 
ft.; thence N 33°51,54"W 66.65 ft.; thence N 
14°33,09MW 65.87 ft.; thence N 4°42'29,,W 67.20 
ft.to the Northeast Corner of said Lot 61; 
thence N 87°24'56"W 130.14 ft. along the North 
line of said Lot 61 to the Point of Beginning. 
Containing 16.4679 acres. 
ARTICLE III 
COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS 
The foregoing submission is made upon and under the 
following covenants, conditions and restrictions: 
3.1 Name; • The Project, as submitted to the provisions 
of this Declaration, shall be known as Barton Woods Planned Unit 
Development. 
3.2 Description of Lots; The Project consists of 
individual lots, each of which may or may not be improved and may 
or may not include improvements authorized on the map and/or by the 
City of Bountiful, Utah. The improvements on some or all of the 
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lots may consist of single family or one-half (1/2) of a duplex 
building with the other one-half (1/2) of the structure being on an 
adjoining lot. The exterior of all buildings will be constructed of 
brick on the lower part, with the upper part being wood, stucco 
and/or such other materials authorized by the Committee. All 
improvements shall be constructed in a style and of materials 
architecturally compatible with the other improvements on the 
Project* 
3.3 Description of Lots. The lots in, their locations, 
and approximate dimensions are indicated on the Map. 
3.4 ' Common Areas and Facilities. The common areas and 
facilities of the Project shall be and are the roads, grass and 
lawn areas, clubhouse facilities, specifically designated 
recreational vehicle and public: parking areas, if any, and any and 
all other common areas and facilities designated as such on the 
Map, and any other future interests in common areas pursuant to the 
terms of this Declaration. 
3.5 Lots and Rights to Common Areas" and Facilities 
Inseparable; The percentage of undivided interest in the common 
areas and facilities shall not be separated from the lot to 
which it appertains and, even though not specifically mentioned in 
the instrument of transfer or conveyance, such „ percentage 
of undivided interest and such right of exclusive use shall 
automatically accompany the transfer and conveyance of the lot 
to which they relate. 
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3.6 Voting - Common Expense - Ownership in Common 
and Facilities: The percentage of undivided ownership i 
common areas and facilities is set ' forth in the attached E^  
"A," and shall be used for all purposes including, but not limited 
tof voting and sharing of the common expenses in the proportionate 
amount equal to the percentage of undivided ownership therein. The 
Association shall be the record owner of all common areas and 
facilities. 
3.7 Easements and Encroachments: If any portion of the 
common areas and facilities or any fences or walls adjacent to a 
lot boundary in the Project are partially or totally destroyed, and 
then rebuilt or improved, maintained, painted, or repaired, 
encroachments shall be permitted as may be necessary, desirable or 
convenient upon the lots, and easements for such encroachments and 
for the maintenance of the same shall exist for such period of time 
as may be necessary, desirable or convenient. In addition, 
encroachments shall be permitted to the Association or its 
designate upon the lots and the common facilities as may be 
necessary, convenient or desirable within the Project for: the 
installation, placing, removal, inspection and maintenance of 
utility lines and utility service facilities; for regular repairs 
and maintenance of exterior portions of improvement on the lots; 
for any emergency or necessary repairs; and for lawn, trees, 
shrubbery and yard care or maintenance. Easements for such 
encroachments shall exist for such period of time as may be 
necessary, convenient or desirable. 
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3.8 Amendments; In addition to the amendment procedure 
provided by law and elsewhere in.this Declaration, the lot owners 
shall have the right to amend this Declaration and/or the Map upon 
the approval and consent of two-thirds (2/3) of the undivided 
interests in the Project and, until the sale from Declarant of lots 
having ownership of at least sixty-seven percent (67%) of the 
common areas and facilities, with the written consent of Declarant, 
which consents and approvals shall be by duly executed and recorded 
instruments. 
ARTICLE IV 
BARTON WOODS, INC. 
4.1 Owners Association: The administration of the 
Project shall be governed by this Declaration and the Articles of 
Incorporation and the By-Laws of Barton Woods, Inc., a Utah Non-
profit Corporation. An owner of a lot shall automatically become 
a member of the Association and shall remain a member for the 
period of his ownership. 
4.2 Association Management: The Association shall 
conduct the general management, operation and maintenance of the 
Project and of the common areas and facilities and the enforcement 
of the provisions, of this Declaration, . the Articles of 
Incorporation and By-Laws of the Association, and rules and 
regulations adopted thereunder. 
4.3 Architectural Control: The Association, by and 
through the Committee, shall be charged and empowered with control 
of all construction, improvements, and landscaping on the Project 
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to ensure consistency and compatibility of all improvements and 
landscaping on the Project. 
ARTICLE V 
LIMITATION OF USE OF LOTS AND COMMON AREAS 
5.1 Purposes; Every lot within the Project shall be used 
for single family residential living purposes, such purposes to be 
confined to approved residential buildings within the subject 
property, whether such lot contains one-half (1/2) of a structure 
or a self-standing residence building. No lots within the Project 
shall be occupied or used for commercial or business purposes; 
provided, however, that nothing in this paragraph 5.1 shall be 
deemed to prevent (a) Declarant or its duly authorized agent from 
using any lot owned by Declarant as a sales office, sales model, 
property management office or rental office, or (b) any owner, or 
the owner's duly authorized agent from renting or leasing the 
owner's residential building from time to time, subject to all of 
the provision of this Declaration. 
5.2 No Obligations; Except for portions of the Project 
expressly designated on the map, there shall be no obstructions of 
the common areas, and nothing shall be, stored .in the common areas 
without the prior consent of the Management Committee. 
5.3 Alterations, Additions and Attachments: No 
building, fence, wall, tennis court, hot tub or similar structure, 
swimming pool or other structure, satellite dish or receiver, or 
outside antenna shall be commenced, erected, altered, placed or 
permitted to exist on any portion of the Project, without the prior 
written approval of the Management Committee. •, All buildings, 
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alterations, improvements, additions and maintenance on the Subject 
Property shall be made in a workmanlike manner and shall be 
architecturally compatible with the rest of the Project. 
5.4 Easements: In addition to any easements of record 
on the Project, the Association shall be entitled to easements on 
all lots and other portions of the Project for drainage facilities 
and for installation, maintenance, placing, removal, inspection, 
painting, repair and improvement of fences, utilities and common 
areas and facilities, for necessary or emergency repairs, and for 
maintenance and care of lawns, trees, shrubbery up to the edge of 
all building constructed in the Project, and such easements shall 
exist whether or not they are specified on the recorded Map, and in 
accordance with paragraph 3.7 of Article III, above. 
5.5 No Animals; No animals, livestock, birds or poultry 
of any kind shall be raised, bred, or kept on any lot or in the 
common areas, except that dogs, cats and other household pets under 
the weight of fifteen- pounds may be kept provided that they are not 
kept, bred, or maintained for any commercial purpose and, provided 
further, that they do not become an annoyance-or nuisance, for any 
reason, to any owner or resident of a lot. Such animals as ..are 
permitted shall be strictly controlled and kept pursuant to 
Bountiful City ordinances and regulations, and the rules and 
regulations of the Management Committee. In addition, the owners 
of each animal shall be solely responsible for the clean-up of that 
animal's waste and for repair of all damage cause by that animal. 
1
 >. 
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5.6 Ho Offensive Activity: No noxious or of fen. 
activity shall be carried on in any lot or in the common areas, 
shall anything be done therein which may be or become an annoyance 
or nuisance to the other owners. 
5.7 Construction in Common Areas and Lots; Nothing 
shall be altered or constructed in or removed from the common areas 
or Lots, except upon the written consent of the Management 
Committee. 
5.8 Rules; The Management Committee is authorized to 
adopt rules for the use of the common areas and Lots, which rules 
shall be in writing and furnished to the owners. 
5.9 Dumping of Garbage: Except in areas designated on 
the map or by the Management Committee, no lot or portion of the 
common areas shall be used or maintained as a dumping ground for 
rubbish, trash, garbage or other waste, nor shall any rubbish, 
trash, papers, junk or debris be burned within the Project. All 
trash, rubbish, garbage or other waste within the boundaries of the 
Project shall be kept only in sanitary containers. Each lot shall 
be kept free of trash and refuse by the owner of such lot. No 
person shall allow any unsightly, unsafe or dangerous conditions to 
exist on or in any lot. 
5.10 Excavation; No excavation for stone, gravel or 
earth shall be made on the subject property unless such excavation 
is made in connection with the erection of a building, structure, 
landscaping or other improvement thereon. 
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5.11 Parking of Vehicles: No vehicles shall be parked 
overnight on any of the streets or roadways in the Project or on 
any common areas of the Project, nor on any lot outside of any 
enclosed garage, except such vehicles, and upon such portions of 
the Project, specifically designated for this purpose on the map or 
by the Management Committee, In addition, no boats, campers, 
trailers, large trucks, motor homes, or similar large items shall 
be parked or stored on any lot; or in the common areas, except in 




6.1 Obtaining of Insurance Policies; The Management 
Committee shall obtain and maintain, at all times,' a policy or 
policies insuring the Management Committee, the lot owners and the 
Manager against any liability to the public or to the owners of 
lots and common areas, and their invitees or tenants, incident to 
the ownership and/or use of the common areas of the project, issued 
by such insurance companies and with such limits of liability as 
determined by the Management Committee. Each such policy or 
policies shall be issued on the comprehensive liability basis, and 
shall provide cross-liability endorsement wherein the rights of 
named insured under the policy or policies shall not be prejudiced 
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6.2 Other Insurance; In addition , the Management 
Committed may obtain insurance for such other risks of a similar or 
dissimilar nature as are or shall hereafter customarily be covered 
with respect to common areas or other Projects similar in 
construction, design and use. 
ARTICLE VII 
COMMON ASSESSMENTS 
7.1 Payment of Expenses: Each lot owner shall pay to 
the Management Committee that owner's portion of the costs and 
expenses required and deemed necessary, and upon the terms of 
payment determined by the Management Committee," in connection with 
water, sewer and other utility services and connection fees (if not 
directly metered or billed to individual lots) to the Project and 
costs and expenses deemed necessary to manage, maintain and operate 
the common areas and facilities of the Project, and may include, 
among other things, the cost of management; taxes; special 
assessments; fire, casualty and public liability insurance 
premiums; the Association's share of costs, if any, incurred 
pursuant to Section 7.4 below; common lighting, if any; landscaping 
and the
 :care of grounds, both of common areas and lawns and 
shrubbery on individual lots; maintenance, repairs and painting of 
the exterior of any structures on the lots; repairs and renovations 
of common areas and facilities, recreational areas and facilities, 
if any; snow removal, if any; wages and charges; legal and 
accounting fees; water and sewer charges not separately metered or 
charged to lots; cost of operating all gas-fired equipment and the 
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cost .of electricity; expenses and liabilities incurred by the 
Management Committee under or by reason of this Declaration, the 
Articles of Incorporation or By-Laws of the Association; the 
payment of any deficit remaining from a previous period; and the 
creation of a reasonable contingency or other reserve or surplus 
relating to this Project. Such payments shall be made upon the 
terms, at the time, and in the manner provided without deduction of 
any off-sets or claims which the owner may have against the 
Committee, and if any owner shall fail to pay any installment 
within one (1) month from the time when the same becomes due, the 
owner shall pay interest thereon *at the rate of one and one-half 
percent (1-1/2%) per month from the date when such installment 
shall become due to the date of the payment thereof, and all costs 
and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by the 
Management Committee in collecting such unpaid assessments, whether 
or not formal legal proceedings have been commenced. 
7.2 Collection of Assessments: The Management Committee 
may, from time to time, up to the close of the year for which such 
cash requirements have been so fixed or determined, increase or 
diminish "the amount previously fixed or determined for such year. 
The assessment may include a pro-rata reallocation among the. lots 
of any unpaid assessments on a lot which are not assessable against 
a lot owner, subject to the provisions of Article IX, below. The 
Committee may include in the cash requirements, for any year, any 
liabilities or items of expense which accrued or became payable in 
the previous year or which might have been included in the cash 
8232-BA7692.1 - 1 7 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
£ 1^24393 B i!593 P 
requirements
 f for a previous year, but were not included thereinf 
arid also any sums which the Management Committee may deem necessary 
or prudent to provide a reserve against liabilities or expenses 
then accrued or thereafter to accrue although not payable in that 
year. In any year in which there is an excess of assessments 
received over' amounts actually used for the purposes described in 
this Declaration such excess may, upon written consent of all 
members, be applied against and reduce the subsequent year's 
assessment or be refunded to the members. The preceding sentence 
shall automatically be repealed upon the revocation of Revenue 
Ruling 70-604, 19 70-2, CB 9 promulgated by the Internal Revenue 
Service or upon a court of competent appellate jurisdiction 
declaring such Revenue Ruling invalid or upon amendment of the 
Internal Revenue Code or the Treasury Regulations thereunder 
obviating the requirement of a membership vote to apply such excess 
to the subsequent year's assessments or to refund the same in order 
that such excess be excluded from gross income of the Association. 
Notwithstanding any other provision herein to the 
contrary, assessments and any other charges shall include an 
adequate reserve fund for maintenance, repairs and replacement of 
those elements of the common areas and facilities that must be 
replaced on a periodic basis and are payable in regular 
installments rather than by special assessments. 
7.3 Determination of Amounts; The pro-rata portion 
payable by the owner in and for each year or portion of year shall 
be the ratio, a sum within limits and on conditions hereinabove 
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provided, calculated by multiplying the aggregate amount of 
cash requirements for such year, or portion of year, by the ov 
percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and 
facilities- All such assessments, together with the additional 
sums accruing under this Declaration, shall be payable monthly in 
advance, or in such payments and installments as shall be required 
by the Management Committee, and at such times as shall.be provided 
by the Management Committee. 
7.4 Contracts for Use of Common Areas; The Association 
shall, if the Management Committee in its sole discretion 
determines, have the right to enter into an agreement or agreements 
with the owner or owners of the Phase I properties and/or the 
Clubhouse Property (as defined in the Recitals to this Agreement) 
for the Association's participation in or sharing of common areas 
and facilities between or among the owners of the various 
properties. The provisions of any such agreement, and the term 
thereof, shall be upon such conditions, provisions and terms as the 
Management Committee in its sole discretion determines. Such 
agreements may provide for the Association to pay its proportionate 
share of all costs and expenses of such other common areas and 
facilities, which cost shall be an expense to the Association under 
Section 7.1 above. 
7.5 Unimproved Lots: It is the express intention of 
this Declaration, and this Declaration shall be so construed, that 
the entire pro-rata assessments payable to the Management Committee 
herein shall be made only to the extent so as to allow occupancy of 
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such lots. Accordingly, notwithstanding any other provisions of 
this Declaration, the Management Committee shall have discretionary 
powers to assess amounts less than the entire pro-rata assessments, 
or no assessments, specified above with respect to any lot on which 
habitable improvements have not been completed on such lot. 
7.G Powers of Management Committee; The Management 
Committee shall have discretionary powers to provide in this 
Declaration and in the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of the 
Association, to prescribe the manner of maintaining the operation 
of the Project, and to determine the cash requirements of the 
Management Committee to be paid as aforesaid by the owners under 
this Declaration. Every such reasonable determination by the 
Committee within the bounds of this Declaration shall be final and 
conclusive as to the owners, and any expenditures made by the 
Committee within the bounds of this Declaration shall be deemed, as 
against the owners, necessary and properly made for such purpose. 
7.7 Application of Lease Payments; If any owner shall, 
at any time, let or sublet any lot and shall default for a period 
of one' (1) month in payment of any management assessments, the 
Management Committee may, at its option, so long as such default 
shall continue, demand and receive from any tenant or subtenant of 
such owner occupying the lot, the rent due or becoming due up to 
the amount of such assessment payable, together with all penalties 
provided herein. Such payment of rent to the Committee shall be 
sufficient payment and discharge of such tenant or subtenant as 
8232.BA7692.1 -20-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
t i 24393 B 1 5 9 3 
between such tenant or subtenant and such owner to the extent of 
the amount so "paid. 
7.8 Collection of Assessments: Each monthly assessment 
and each special assessment shall be separate, distinct and 
personal debts and obligations of the owner against whom the same 
are assessed at the time the assessment is made, and shall be 
collectible as such. Suit to recover money judgment for unpaid 
common expenses may be maintained without foreclosing or waiving 
the lien securing the same. The amount of assessment, whether 
regular or special, assessed to the owner of any lot plus interest 
at one and one-half percent (1-1/2%) per month and the costs, 
including reasonable attorneys fees, shall become a lien upon such 
lot upon recordation of notice of assessment. Said lien for non-
payment of common expenses shall have priority over all other liens 
and encumbrances, recorded or unrecorded, except only: 
(a) Tax and special assessment liens on the lot in 
favor of any assessment authority, or special district; 
and 
(b) Encumbrances on the owner's lot and such 
owner's interest in the common areas recorded prior to 
the date such notice is recorded which by law would be a. 
lien prior to subsequently recorded encumbrances, 
A certificate executed and acknowledged by a majority of 
the Management Committee stating the indebtedness secured by the 
lien upon any lot in the Project hereunder shall be conclusive upon 
the Management Committee and the owners as to the amount of such 
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indebtedness on the date of the certificate, in favor of all 
persons who rely thereon in good faith, and such certificate shall 
be furnished to any owner or any encumbrancer or prospective 
encumbrancer of a lot upon request at a reasonable fee, not to 
exceed Ten Dollars ($10.00). Unless the request for a certificate 
of indebtedness shall be complied with within ten (10) days, all 
unpaid common expenses which become due prior to the date of the 
making of such request shall be subordinate to the lien held by the 
person making the request. Any encumbrancer holding a lien on the 
lot may pay any unpaid common expenses payable with respect to such 
lot and upon such payment such encumbrancer shall have a lien on 
such lot for the amounts paid of the same ranks as the lien of his 
encumbrance. 
Upon payment of a delinquent assessment concerning which 
such a certificate has been so recorded, or other satisfaction 
thereof the Management Committee shall cause to be recorded, in the 
same manner as the certificate of indebtedness, a further 
certificate stating the satisfaction and the release of the lien 
thereof. Such lien for non-payment of assessment may be enforced 
by sale by the Management Committee or by a bank or trust company 
or title insurance company authorized by the Management.Committee, 
such sale to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of law 
applicable to the exercise of powers of sale or foreclosure in 
deeds of trust or mortgages or in any manner permitted by law. In 
any foreclosure of sale, the owner shall be required to pay the 
8232.BA7692.1 -22-
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costs and expenses of such proceedings and reasonable attorney's 
fees. 
In case of foreclosure, the owner shall be required to pay 
a reasonable rental for the lot from the date the foreclosure 
action is filed with the Court having jurisdiction over the matter, 
and the Plaintiff in the foreclosure action shall be entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver, at the time such action is filed, to 
collect th"e rental without regard to the value of the mortgaged 
security. In any foreclosure or sale, the owner shall also be 
required to pay the costs and expenses of such proceedings and 
reasonable 'attorney's fees. The Management Committee or Manager 
shall have the power to bid on the lot. at foreclosure or other sale 
and to hold, lease, mortgage and convey the lot. 
ARTICLE VIII 
MORTGAGE PROTECTION 
Notwithstanding all other provisions herein to the 
contrary: .m-
8.1 Rights of First Refusal; Any "right of first 
refusal" which may be granted herein shall not impair the rights of 
the first mortgagee of a lot to: . •_ . 
(a) Foreclose or take -title to a lot pursuant to 
the remedies provided in. the mortgage, or 
(b) Accept a deed (or assignment) in lieu of 
foreclosure in the event of default by a mortgagor, or 




 • • 
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8.2 Title in Mortgagee: Any first mortgagee who obtains 
title to a lot pursuant to the remedies provided in the mortgage or 
foreclosure of the mortgage will not be liable for such lot's 
unpaid dues or charges which accrue prior to the acquisition of 
title of such lot by the mortgagee. 
8.3 Consent of Mortgagees: Unless at least two-thirds 
(2/3) of the first mortgagees (based .upon one vote for each first 
mortgage owned) or owners (other than the sponsor, developer or 
builder) of the individual lots in the Project have given their 
prior written approval, the Association or any corporation or trust 
established by the Association shall not be entitled to: 
(a) By act or omission, seek to abandon, 
partition, subdivide, encumber, sell or transfer any 
common areas or facilities owned, directly or indirectly, 
by the Association or any corporation or trust 
established by the Association, for the benefit of the 
lots in the Project (the granting of easements for public 
utilities or for other public purposes consistent with 
the intended use of such common areas and facilities by 
the Project shall not .be deamed a transfer within the 
meaning of this clause)-; 
(b) Change the method of determining the 
obligations^ assessments, dues or other charges which may 
be levied against a lot owner; 
(c) By act or omission, change, waive or abandon 
any scheme of regulations, or enforcement thereof, 
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pertaining to the architectural design or the exterior 
appearance of lots, the exterior maintenance of lots, the 
maintenance of any common property party walls or common 
fences or driveways, or the upkeep of lawns and plantings 
in the Project; 
(d) Fail to maintain fire and extended coverage on 
insurable common areas and facilities_ on a current 
replacement cost basis in an amount not less than one 
hundred percent (100%) of the insurable value (based on 
current replacement cost), 
(e) Use hazard insurance proceeds for losses to 
any common areas and facilities other than the repair, 
replacement or reconstruction of such common areas and 
facilities• 
8.4 Taxes and Expenses: First mortgagees of lots may, 
jointly or singly, pay taxes or other charges which are in default 
and which may or have become a charge against any common areas and 
facilities and may pay overdue premiums on hazard insurance 
policies, or secure new hazard insurance coverage on the lapse of 
a policy, for such- common areas and facilities, and first 
mortgagees making such payments shall -be owed immediate 
reimbursement therefor from the Association. 
8.5 Notice of Default bv Individual Lot Borrower: A 
first mortgagee of a lot, upon request, shall be entitled to 
written notification from the Association of any default in the 
performance by the individual lot borrower of any obligation under 
% *. 
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Unit Development, which is not cured within sixty (60) days. 
8.6 Management Agreements; Any agreement for 
professional management of the Project, or any other contract 
providing for services of the developer, sponsor or builder, may 
not exceed three (3) years. Any such agreement must provide for 
termination by either party without cause and without payment of a 
termination fee oh ninety (90) days or less written notice. 
8.7 Mo Priority: No- provision herein is intended, nor 
shall it be construed, to give any lot owner, or any other party, 
priority over any rights of the first mortgagee of a lot pursuant 
to its mortgage in the case of a distribution to such lot owner of 
insurance proceeds or condemnation awards for losses to or a taking 
of common areas and facilities. 
ARTICLE IX 
VACATING PRIOR COVENANTS 
AND RESTRICTIONS 
The Declarant, and all other owners of, and lien holders 
on, any and all portions of the Subject Property, conclusively and 
irrevocably agree that all prior recorded covenants, conditions, 
restrictions and declarations of every nature are. vacated and 
terminated in their entirety and are superseded in their entirety 
by the provisions of this Declaration, including, but not limited 
to: 
a. . The Enabling Declaration of Lakeview Terrace 
Condominiums Phase No. 1, dated July 16, 1979, together 
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with the attached bylaws, recorded November 14, 1979 , as 
Entry No. 55044, in Book 801, at pages 487-522, 
inclusive, of the records of the Davis County Recorder. 
b. The First Amendment to the Enabling 
Declaration and Bylaws of Lakeview Terrace Condominiums, 
" dated October 1, 1987, and recorded October 1, 1987, as 
Entry No. 0803513, in Book 1196r at pages 1113-1133, 
inclusive, of the records of the Davis County Recorder. 
c. The Record of Survey Map of Lakeview Terrace 
(Phase 1) recorded in the office of the County Recorder 
of Davis County, Utah, on November 11, 1979, as Entry No. 
550443. 
d. Restrictive Covenants, dated December 4, 1974, 
and recorded December 4, 1974, as Entry No. 405948, in 
Book 556, at Page 86, et. seq., in the records of the 
Davis County Recorder. 
e. Restrictive Covenants, dated February 18, 
1976, and recorded March 8, 1976, as entry No. 429197, in 
Book 593, at Page 881, et. seq., in the records of the 
Davis County Recorder. 
f. Declaration of Restrictions, dated June 15, 
1976, and recorded June 16, 1976, as Entry No. 436079, in 
Book 605, at pages 430, et. seq. in the records of the 
Davis County Recorder. 
g. Revised Restrictive Covenants, dated June 28, 
1979, and recorded October 2, 1979, in Book 795, at Pages 
* \ 
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Recorder. 
ARTICLE X 
* MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
10.1 Interpretation: The provisions of this Declaration 
shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose of creating 
a uniform plan for the development and operation of a planned unit 
development. Failure to enforce any provision hereof shall not 
constitute a waiver of the rights to enforce said provision or any 
other provision hereof. 
10.2 Severability: The provisions hereof shall be deemed 
independent and severable, and the invalidity or partial invalidity 
or unenforceability of any one provision or portion thereof shall 
not effect the validity or enforceability of any other provision 
hereof. 
10.3 Counterparts; This Declaration may be executed 
simultaneously in any number .of counterparts, each of which shall 
be deemed an original, but all of which together shall constitute 
one and the same instrument. 
10.4 Governing Law and Jurisdiction; Interpretation and 
enforcement of this Declaration shall be according to the laws of 
Utah. Jurisdiction and venue of any dispute hereunder shall be in 
Davis County, Utah, or in the United States District Court for 
Utah. 
10.5 Default; If any party governed by the terms of this 
Declaration defaults under any provision hereof, that defaulting 
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party shall pay all costs and attorneys' fees incurred by any other 
party to enforce the provisions hereof, whether incurred through 
formal lawsuit or otherwise. 
10.6 Paragraph Numbers and Headings: Headings and 
paragraph numbers have been inserted herein solely for convenience 
and reference and shall not be construed to affect the meanings, 
construction or effect hereof. 
1*0.7 Effective Date; This Declaration shall take effect 
upon recording. 
DECLARANT: 
BARTONWOOD LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
A Utah L i m i t e d L i a b i l i t y Company 
B CXMrvuJa. £ fy^x 
I t s : ^-fc-XJs-i ss.j?_A 
-J 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the I&4) of ^J'utsiL'lu. . 1993, A.D., personally 
appeared before me Lynda Hobson, who being duly sworn, did say that 
she is the Manager of Bartonwood Limited Liability Company, and 
that the within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of 
said limited liability company by authority of its governing 
documejvfcs^^n^of^its jmembers. 
i x&stiSK Notary Pubfle ! 
• &&T$k SANDRAKKEATON I 
f fV/SSssKw 261 EttOOO Swift Suite «2001 
vlwl/ ^ k ^ f f i ^ 1 NNgw, ^gSgTi^ *88 
I X j g ^ - StotDolUfch j 
My Commission Expires:^ 
B232.BA7692.1 
Wand-i*:, /f &*fcn 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
R e s i d i n g a t : SriC?'?f/lA' fet*n& ~U/*£. 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
TO THE ENABLING DECLARATION OF COVENANTS, 
CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS OF 
BARTON WOODS PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT 
The Planned Unit Development consists of sixty (60) lots. 
Improvements on a portion of the lots may consist of single family, 
detached residential structures; and improvements on the remaining 
lots may consist of duplex buildings with each such building being 
situated on two adjoining lots. 
Each lot, regardless of the nature of the improvements 
thereon, shall be entitled to ownership of one-sixtieth (l/60th) 
undivided interest in the common areas and facilities of the 
Project; and each Lot shall be responsible for and subject to one-
sixtieth (l/G0th) of the total assessments by the Association for 
the Project. One-sixtieth of thq interests herein equals one and 
two-thirds"percent (1 2/3%). 
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-A> JARES ASHAUERT DAVIS CKTY RECORDER 
£ * ; CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT jff^tim 
DECLARATION 
OF PROTECTIVE COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS 
% . - ~ A 1 D F BARTON WOODS PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT 
i ^ H - ? f Q i f h f ^ ^ s i a , 
I & & " o 4 o \ t h r u C i ^ i £ 
^ Pursuant to Section ?.8 or the Enabling Declaration of Protective Covenants, 
Conditions and Restrictions of Barton Woods Plannpd Unit Development recorded with the 
Davis County Recorder on March 24, 1993 as Entry No. 1024393 in Book No. 1593 at 
pages 59 to 88, (the "First Declaration"), an election of the Members of Barton Woods, Inc. 
(the "Association") was called to consider the amendments to the First Declaration reflected 
in this Certificate. At such election, more than two-thirds (2/3) of the votes entitled to be 
cast by the Members were cast in favor of amending the First Declaration as set forth in this 
Certificate. Accordingly, the First Declaration is hereby amended to read as follows: 
Paragraph 1.1 is rewritten in its entirety to read as follows: 
1.1 Association: Barton Woods Homeowners Association, Inc., a Utah 
non-profit corporation, formed for management of the Project and more fully described in 
Article IV, below. 
Paragraph 1.6 is rewritten in its entirety to read as follows: 
1.6 Manager: The Board of Trustees of the Association or such person or 
entity designated by the Board of Trustees to manage the Project. 
Paragraph 4.1 is rewritten in its entirety to read as follows: 
4.1 Owners Association: The Project shall be administered by a Utah Non-
profit Corporation named Barton Woods Homeowners Association, Inc. An owner of a Lot 
shall automatically become a member of the Association and shall remain a member for the 
period of his or her ownership. 
Paragraph 4.3 is rewritten in its entirety to read as follows: 
4.3 Design Review Committee: The purposes of the Design Review 
Committee (the "Committee") shall be to create, maintain and improve Barton Woods 
Planned Unit Development as a pleasant and desirable environment, to establish and preserve 
a harmonious design for the community and to protect and promote the value of the 
Property, exterior design, landscaping and changes or alterations to the existing use of the 
Property. 
follows: 
Paragraph 4.4 is added to the Declaration and shall read in its entirety as 
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4.4 Creation of Design Review Cnmmine^: The Committee will consist of 
at least three members but may have as many members as may be appointed by the Board 
firom time to time in accordance with the Association's Bylaws. Any Member who owns five 
or more Lots in the Project shall be appointed as a member of the Committee. The regular 
term of office for each Committee member shall be one year, coinciding with the fiscal year 
of the Association. Any such Committee member may be removed with or without cause by 
the Board at any time by written notice to such appointee. A successor or successors 
appointed to fill such vacancy shall serve the remainder of the term of the former member. 
Paragraph 4.5 is added to the Declaration and shall read in its entirety as 
follows: 
4.5 Powers of Design Review Committee: The Committee is hereby 
authorized to perform the design review functions prescribed in this Declaration and the 
Association's Bylaws and to cany out the provisions set forth therein. The Committee is 
authorized to retain the services of one or more consulting architects, landscape architects or 
urban designers, who need not be licensed to practice in the State of Utah, to advise and 
assist the Committee in performing its duties. 
At its option, the Committee may require that the Lot owner submitting plans 
for review pay a $100 design review fee to the Board before any home and landscape plans 
shall be reviewed or approved by the Committee. The $100 fee will be used by the Board to 
pay the costs of architects an other professionals retained by the Committee to review home 
plans. Lot owners are encouraged to submit preliminary-schematic drawings to the 
Committee as soon as possible in order to avoid unnecessary revisions and delay in 
construction. 
The Committee may reject any home and landscape plans it deems do not 
comply with the provisions of this Declaration. The decision of the Committee may be 
reviewed by the Board on appeal by the owner or at the Board's own discretion. No 
construction may begin on any Lot until the Committee has approved the home and landscape 
plans. 
Paragraph 4.6 is added to the Declaration and shall read in its entirety as 
follows: 
4.6 Security Deposit: The Committee shall not approve any home and 
landscape plans until the owner or the owner's Contractor delivers a cashier's check in the 
amount of $2,500 to the Committee to serve as a Security Deposit. This Security Deposit 
shall be placed in the Association's checking account and may be used by the Committee, in 
its discretion, to cure any damage to parkstrips, sprinkler lines, pipes, sidewalks, roads, Lots 
or any other Common Areas that may occur as a result of the Contractor's construction of 
the owner's improvements. If the Committee determines that any damage to parkstrips, 
sprinkler lines, pipes, sidewalks, roads, Lots or any other Common Areas has occurred as a 
result of the construction, whether by the Contractor, a subcontractor, the owner, visitor, or 
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other individual, the Committee shall make a finding to such effect, specifying the particular 
condition or conditions which exist, and pursuant thereto give notice thereof to the owner and 
the Contractor that unless corrective action is taken within fourteen days, the Committee may 
cause such action to be taken and pay for such action with monies from the Security Deposit. 
If the Security Deposit is insufficient to cure any damage, both the owner and the Contractor 
may be billed for the balance due. The Committee is authorized and empowered to cause an 
action to be taken for collection of any balance due under this paragraph and the costs 
thereof shall be assessed against such owner and his or her Lot as a Maintenance Charge and 
shall be secured by the Assessment Lien. Any portion of the Security Deposit that is not 
used to cure any damages, shall be returned to the owner or the owner's Contractor upon 
completion of the construction of the owner's improvements. 
Paragraph 4.7 is added to the Declaration and shall read in its entirety as 
follows: 
Enforcement. If an owner's construction deviates from his or her approved 
plans, the Committee may require that the owner comply with the approved plans. If the 
Committee determines that any construction does not comply with the approved plans, the 
Committee shall so notify the owner and require that corrective action be taken within 
fourteen days. If at the expiration of said fourteen-day period of time the requisite corrective 
action has not been taken, the Board shall be authorized and empowered to cause such action 
to be taken and the cost and legal fees thereof shall be assessed against such owner and his 
or her Lot as a Maintenance Charge and shall be secured by the Assessment Lien. 
Paragraphs 5.3 and 5.7 are amended by substituting the words "Design Review 
Committee" for the words "Management Committee." 
Paragraph 7.5 is rewritten in its entirety to read as follows: 
7.5 Unimproved T^ ots: As of the date of this Certificate of Amendment, all 
unimproved Lots, except those currently owned by O.C. Oaks, LLC, shall be assessed the 
monthly operating and maintenance assessments payable under this Declaration just as are the 
Lots that have improvements on them. Unimproved Lots owned by O.C. Oaks, LLC shall 
be assessed the monthly operating and maintenance assessments payable under this 
Declaration at the earlier of (1) the date an improvement is completed on the Lot or (2) one 
year from the date a Lot currently owned by O.C. Oaks, LLC is sold to an individual who 
owns 5 or fewer Lots in the Development. Special assessments for such things as capital 
improvements may be imposed on all improved and unimproved Lots if the consent of two-
thirds (2/3) of the Members is obtained. 
A new Paragraph 7.9 is added to the Declaration and shall read in its entirety 
as follows: 
7.9 Combination of Lots: Lots 301 and 302 shall be treated as one Lot for 
building, voting, and assessment purposes and shall be designated as "Lot 301." Lots 409 
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and 410 shall be treated as one Lot for building, voting and assessment purposes and shall be 
designated as "Lot 410." Lots 507 and 508 shall be treated as one Lot for building, voting, 
and assessment purposes and shall be designated as "Lot 507." If Bountiful City requires 
that two Lots be joined as one Lot in order for a building permit to be issued, the Owner 
may ask the Board to treat the two Lots as one Lot for assessment purposes, and such 
request may be granted at the discretion of the Board. If two Lots are joined by an Owner to 
form one Lot upon which one improvement is constructed, the assessments assessed against 
the combined Lots shall be seventy-five percent (75 %) of the total of the assessments that 
would have been made against die Lots had they remained as two separate Lots. If three 
Lots are joined by Owners to form two Lots upon which one improvement is constructed 
upon each of the two Lots, the assessments assessed against each Lot shall be seventy-five 
percent (75%) of the total assessment that would have been levied against one and one-half 
Lots. 
Exhibit A is hereby amended in its entirety to read as follows: 
Exhibit A 
Percentage of Undivided Ownership in Common Areas 
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57 100% 
A new Paragraph 7.10 is added to the Declaration and shall read in its entirety 
7.10 Withdrawal of Lots. As of the date of this Certificate of Amendment, 
O.C. Oaks, LLC owns Lots 101, 112, 113 and 301. O.C. Oaks, LLC may elect to 
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withdraw any one or all of these Lots from the Barton Woods Planned Unit Development and 
its Protective Covenants provided it makes the withdrawal election prior to the time it 
transfers ownership of any of these Lots to another person of entity and records a Notice of 
Withdrawal with the Davis County Recorder, signed by the President of Barton Woods 
Homeowners Association, Inc., prior to the time.it transfers ownership of the particular Lot 
to another person or entity. 
BARTON WOODS HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC. 
Signed By: (W///Mjrt&/t^ 
fonn Marshall, President 
Attested By: 
Secretary 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
: ss 
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. ." _ The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this / 7 % y of 
sPMtJy > 1997 by Ronn Marshall and T.J. Green who acknowledged to me that they 
are7the President and Secretary, respectively, of Barton Woods Homeowners Association, 
Inc. 
4. 





Notary Public " 1 
KRISTIS. BLACK , 
1259 South 325 East I 
Bountiful. Utah 84010 . 
My Commission Expires | 
January 1,2001 
state^ooitah^ j | Notary Public 
My commission expires: LAop } 
do:\DJCD\CCRAMEND.BAR 
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WOOD CRAPO LLC 
David J. Crapo, No. 5055 
Richard J. Armstrong, No. 7461 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 366-6060 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
BARTON WOODS HOMEOWNERS ] 
ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, ' ) 
v. 
DENA STEWART, an individual, and JOHN ; 
DOES 1-10, ; 
Defendants. 
> DECLARATION OF KEITH 
I JONES 
) Civil No. 070700680 
) Judge John M. Memmott 
KEITH JONES, declares as follows: 
1. I am over 21 years of age, have personal knowledge of the facts 
averred to herein, and am otherwise competent to testify to the matters asserted herein. 
2. I currently reside at 941 South Fremont Road, Bountiful, Utah 84010, 
which is located in the Barton Woods Planned Unit Development ("BWPUD"). 
3. I am currently a member of the Barton Woods Homeowners' Association 
("B WHOA") Design Review Committee ("DRC"). 
4. As a member of the B WHO A DRC, I am familiar with the original and 
amended covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CC&Rs") applicable to owners within the 
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Barton Woods Planned Unit Development ("BWPUD"). 
5. In particular, I am familiar with paragraph 4.3 of the amended CC&Rs and 
its provision governing the DRC, as well as with provisions in the original CC&Rs governing the 
exterior of buildings within the BWPUD. 
6. I have reviewed the Affidavit of Shaun Shepherd dated January 22,2009 
and Exhibits 1 and 3 of that affidavit, including the bullet points that list purported irregularities 
with the properties pictured. 
7. I am familiar with Lots 101 and 102 identified in Mr. Shepherd's 
Affidavit. These properties are compliant with the CC&Rs and do not show that the DRC has 
abandoned the CC&Rs. 
8. I am familiar with Lot 103. This property does not have an irregular front 
door and does not have irregular lights. This property also does not have exterior shutters. 
Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. Indeed, this 
property does not show that the DRC has abandoned the CC&Rs. 
9. I am familiar with Lot 104. This property does not have an irregular front 
door, or irregular lights. This property also does not have exterior shutters. Moreover, this 
property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
10. I am familiar with Lots 105 and 106. This property does not have an 
irregular front door, and the property is otherwise consistent with the CC&Rs in design and 
architecture. 
11. I am familiar with Lot 107. This property does not have dark trim around 
the windows and roof line. This property does not have an irregular front door or an irregular 
mailbox. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
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12. I am familiar with Lot 108. This property does not have an irregular front 
door or an irregular mailbox. This property does not have a hot tub. Attached hereto as Exhibit 
1 are two photographs of the back of the home on Lot 108. The first photograph shows a striped 
cover, and the second photograph shows an uncovered patio table and chairs. See Ex. 1. 
Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
13. I am familiar with Lot 109. This property does not have an irregular front 
door. However, this property has a dark brown garage door, dark exterior shutters, dark stone or 
rock above the front entrance and the garage, and a brown mailbox. The dark stone above the 
garage door and front entrance is completely different from the brick that covers the other 
portions of the home's exterior. There are no properties in the BWHOA that have these features. 
From my standpoint as a member of the DRC, this property violates the CC&Rs because of these 
features, and because the owner never obtained approval from the DRC prior to making these 
changes to the property. 
14. I am familiar with Lots 110 and 111. This property does not have an 
irregular front door. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and 
architecture. 
15. I am familiar with Lot 201. This is a vacant lot next to Dena Stewart's 
property. I am unaware of any CC&Rs that this lot is violating or has violated. 
16. I am familiar with Lot 202. This property does not have an irregular front 
door, an irregular mailbox, or irregular lights. Moreover, this property is consistent with the 
CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
17. I am familiar with Lot 203. This property does not have an irregular front 
door, or an irregular mailbox. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and architecture. 
18. I am familiar with Lot 204. This property does not have an irregular light 
or an irregular mailbox. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and 
architecture. 
19. I am familiar with Lot 205. This home does not have an irregular front 
door or irregular lights. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and 
architecture. 
20. I am familiar with Lot 206. This home does not have irregular lights and 
does not have irregular protruding trim and design. The dark front door is not inconsistent with 
the demands of the association or the design review committee, as the association has not 
complained about Defendant's dark front door. Lot 206 is consistent with the CC&Rs in design 
and architecture. 
21. I am familiar with Lot 208. This home does not have an irregular mailbox 
or irregular lights. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and 
architecture. 
22. I am familiar with Lot 301. This property does not have irregular two tone 
brick colors, does not have protruding trim around the windows and roof lines. This property 
does not have irregular lights or an irregular mailbox. Moreover, this property is consistent with 
the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
23. I am familiar with Lot 302. This property does not have an irregular front 
door. The Association has not complained about Defendant's dark front door. The black 
mailbox on Lot 302 was approved by the DRC because the owner reported that her white 
mailbox had been wrecked by motor vehicles on two separate occasions during the winter 
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months when snow covered the ground. The owner felt that the white mailbox was camouflaged 
in the snow and that installing a black mailbox would prevent further accidents. This property 
does not have irregular lights. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design 
and architecture. 
24. I am familiar with Lot 303. The brown mailbox on this property was 
approved by the DRC because the owner reported that the white mailbox had been wrecked by a 
motor vehicle on one occasion during the winter months when snow covered the ground. The 
owner felt that the white mailbox was camouflaged in the snow and that installing a brown 
mailbox would prevent further accidents. This property does not have exterior shutters, and does 
not have irregular lights. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and 
architecture. 
25. I am familiar with Lot 304. This property does not have an irregular front 
door or irregular lights. The hot tub in the back yard was approved by the DRC prior to its 
installation by the owner. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and 
architecture. 
26. I am familiar with Lot 305. This property does not have an irregular front 
door, or irregular lights. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and 
architecture. 
27. I am familiar with Lot 306. This property does not have an irregular 
mailbox, an irregular front door, or irregular lights. Moreover, this property is consistent with 
the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
28. I am familiar with Lot 307. This property does not have an irregular brick 
design, an irregular mailbox, or irregular lights. Moreover, this property is consistent with the 
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CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
29. I am familiar with Lot 308. This property does not have irregular fencing 
or irregular lights. This property also does not have exterior shutters. Moreover, this property is 
consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
30. I am familiar with Lot 309. This property does not have irregular lights, or 
an irregular mailbox, or an irregular front door. Moreover, this property is consistent with the 
CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
31. I am familiar with Lot 310. This property does not have an irregular 
design above the garage, does not have irregular lights, and does not have an irregular front door. 
Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
32. I am familiar with Lot 311. This property does not have an irregular door, 
or irregular rod iron handrails. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design 
and architecture. 
33.1 am familiar with Lot 312. This property does not have irregular rod-iron 
handrails, or irregular lights. The brown front door is not irregular. Moreover, this property is 
consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
34. I am familiar with Lot 401. This property does not have an irregular front 
door, or irregular lights. This property also does not have exterior shutters. Moreover, this 
property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
35. I am familiar with Lot 402. This property does not have an irregular front 
door, irregular lights, or an irregular mailbox. Moreover, this property is consistent with the 
CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
36. I am familiar with Lot 403. This property has a green chain link fence. 
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This fence was allowed to be built on this residence because the occupant of the home has 
Alzheimer's disease. The fence acts to contain the owner in her backyard, and prevents her from 
falling over the hill in the back of her home. The green fence therefore acts as a safety device. 
This property does not have an irregular mailbox or irregular lights. Moreover, this property is 
consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
37. I am familiar with Lot 404. This property does not have irregular lights, or 
an irregular mailbox. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and 
architecture. 
38. I am familiar with Lot 405. This property does not have irregular lights or 
an irregular front door. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and 
architecture. 
39. I am familiar with Lot 406. This property does not have irregular lights 
and does not have an irregular or inconsistent mailbox. Moreover, this property is consistent 
with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
40. I am familiar with combined Lots 407 and 408. This property does not 
have irregular lights or an irregular mailbox. Moreover, this property is consistent with the 
CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
41. I am familiar with combined Lots 409 and 410. This property does not 
have irregular handrails, irregular lights, irregular mailboxes, or irregular front doors. Moreover, 
this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
42. I am familiar with Lot 411. This property is consistent with the CC&Rs in 
design and architecture. 
43. I am familiar with Lot 412. This property is consistent with the CC&Rs in 
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•I 
design and architecture. 
44. I am familiar with Lot 413. My home is located on Lot 413. The picture 
as represented in Shaun Shepherd's affidavit for Lot 413 is not my home. This property is 
consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
45. I am familiar with Lot 414. Kim Geisler's home is located on Lot 414. 
the picture as represented in Shaun Shepherd's affidavit is not the Geisler home. This property is 
consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
46. I am familiar with Lot 415. This property does not have an irregular front 
door or irregular lights. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and 
architecture. 
47. I am familiar with Lot 501. This property does not have irregular dark 
trim around windows and roof lines, irregular lights, or an irregular mailbox. Moreover, this 
property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
48. I am familiar with Lot 502. This property does not have an irregular 
window, an irregular garage door, irregular lights, or an irregular mailbox. Moreover, this 
property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
49. I am familiar with Lot 503. This property does not have dark trim around 
windows, dark trim following the roof line and archways, an irregular iron railing, or an irregular 
front door. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
50. I am familiar with Lot 504. This property does not have dark trim along 
the roof line. Also, it does not have an irregular front door or front window. Moreover, this 
property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
51. I am familiar with Lot 505. This property does not have irregular lights or 
an irregular front door. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and 
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architecture. 
52. I am familiar with Lot 506. This property does not have irregular lights or 
an irregular mailbox. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and 
architecture. 
53. I am familiar with Lot 507. This property does not have irregular lights. 
Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
54. I am familiar with Lot 509. This property does not have an irregular 
archway design, an irregular iron railing, or irregular lights. Moreover, this property is consistent 
with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
55. I am familiar with Lot 510. This property does not have irregular lights 
or an irregular handrails. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and 
architecture. 
56. I am familiar with Lot 511. This property does not have irregular lights, or 
an irregular front door. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and 
architecture. 
57. I am familiar with Lot 512. This property does not have an irregular front 
door. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. 
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and 
correct. 
DATED this H day of March, 2009. 
fe^^^ ^ 
KEITH JONES 7 1 
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